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I. Introduction 
 
 Post-Apartheid South Africa is often identified as “The Rainbow Nation.” It is home to 
two Nobel Peace Prize laureates. Its political redevelopment has centered on the concept of 
ubuntu, or shared humanness. The rights, both socio-economic and civil and political, set forth in 
its Constitution are extensive.  In this new South Africa, the language of human rights and 
democracy is strong, echoing the numerous international human rights declarations and treaties 
South Africa has signed or ratified (including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights). 
South Africa is an especially interesting place to study migration and human rights issues. 
One of the most unique features is its non-encampment system for refugees – a system that 
encourages freedom of movement and one that differs greatly from the policies of other 
developing states and other refugee-receiving states across the African continent. Interested in 
researching how the government was managing this interspersed refugee population, I embarked 
on my field work intending to study how government entities and non-governmental 
organizations were working together to provide services to refugees and asylum seekers residing 
in South Africa. This was my expectation while still in the United States.  
The view from inside South Africa was starkly different. Here, I found NGOs receiving 
little support from the government – a government whose public officials would openly curse the 
damage they claimed refugees were inflicting on their country.  I met a number of people who 
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criticized their government for allowing too many of “them” – black foreigners – into their 
country.  I also met refugees whose homes and businesses were attacked and destroyed by 
nationals. I met refugees who were homeless because South Africans refused to rent them 
housing. I met refugee children fearful of leaving the confines of their orphanage for concern of 
being deported. I met refugee mothers who were refused access to hospitals for their children 
because the staff did not understand their identification card or the privileges refugee status 
guarantees. 
Indeed, the view inside South Africa was starkly different from the popular external 
impression of “The Rainbow Nation.” But what causes this difference? What weakens the power 
of international and domestic laws that aim to protect the rights of refugees and asylum seekers? 
This paper seeks to explore one possible explanation: cultural attitudes. In a country where legal 
protection (i.e.: de jure protection) is strong, how can cultural attitudes, both positive and 
negative, affect the realization of rights in practice (i.e.: de facto)? 
 This paper will use the greater Cape Town region of South Africa to test whether or not 
cultural attitudes toward refugees in a host state affect the rights refugees are able to realize. I 
begin with an analysis and critique of three scholarly approaches to the study of refugee rights. 
In the second section of the paper (on the Model and Hypothesis), I outline the independent and 
dependent variables and their hypothesized relationship to one another. The measurement and 
operationalization of these variables is described in the third section (on Research Design). Here, 
I also select the refugee rights I used to test my hypothesis. In the last two sections, I test the 
original hypothesis, draw conclusions for further research, and discuss the implications of my 
findings for future policy. 
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II. Literature Review: Three Approaches to Assessing Refugee Rights 
 
There is significant scholarly debate over what causes human rights abuses, and from 
these arguments stem a range of opinions on how to promote and protect human rights around 
the world. Is it best to let a state manage its own affairs and choose how, if at all, to protect the 
rights of those living with its borders? Or is an international solution in order? Do a state’s 
domestic condition and policies most affect human rights within its borders, or does affiliation 
with an international organization matter more? Moreover, can citizens within a state affect how 
other populations within the state experience human rights? Although scholars and politicians 
alike have gone back and forth on these questions, few have chosen to turn the debate toward 
refugee rights, specifically, rather than human rights, in general. Refugees are stateless 
individuals, as opposed to citizens who have claim rights on states; it is the sovereign state’s duty 
to protect the rights of its citizens.  Refugees lie beyond the boundaries of this human rights norm 
and are therefore less protected. Furthermore, since refugees lack citizenship in host states, they 
have a limited ability to challenge the government when their rights are abused. This is 
especially true if the host government is not a party to any refugee rights treaties, such as the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, a United Nations convention.i That said, it is 
important for human rights scholars to study what rights these stateless peoples have and to 
understand the varied factors that affect the realization of such rights. 
For the purpose of this literature review, I analyze scholarly debates over factors affecting 
human rights protection, in general, and refugee protection, in particular. I focus on the right to 
personal security and the rights against unlawful arrest, detention, and repatriation or 
deportation. I have organized the literature review around three main scholarly approaches: the 
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“international policy” approach, the “domestic policy” approach, and the “cultural attitude” 
approach. 
 The first two approaches focus on the policies of states. Scholars working from an 
international policy approach claim that rights vary according to whether or not the state is 
affiliated with an international institution or is a signatory to international law. Howard 
Adelman, Ellen Lutz, and Kathryn Sikkink have all studied how international law affects the 
level of human rights experienced by a population, and I analyze examples of their work in detail 
as follows.  
In their study, Lutz and Sikkink (2000) explored why the right to personal security varied 
in two Latin American states (i.e., Uruguay and Paraguay) by studying instances of torture in 
each over twenty year period. Lutz and Sikkink explained variation in rights protection as a 
function of the states’ adherence to international law – specifically, the United Nations (UN) 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and its first Optional Protocol 
(both ratified by Uruguay in the 1970s). Lutz and Sikkink attributed the fact that about fifty 
percent of the political prisoners in Uruguay were detained between 1972-1974 to the fact that 
the treaty was not enforceable until 1976. After the treaty was enforced, Uruguayan citizens were 
able to bring their claims of torture during imprisonment to the UN, leading the UN to order 
Uruguay to release its political prisoners and compensate them for their illegal and abusive 
incarceration. Moreover, the UN’s involvement in the plight of the Uruguayan prisoners attracted 
international and media attention to Uruguay so that the international human rights community 
was able to help abused Uruguayan citizens and pressure governments, such as the United States, 
to intervene (Lutz and Sikkink 2000, 642-643). Overall, Lutz and Sikkink argue that the case of 
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Uruguay demonstrates that signing an international treaty advances the level of human rights 
protection that citizens are able to experience. 
In the same study, the authors strengthen their claim by offering a counter example: the 
case of Paraguay, which chose not to ratify the ICCPR in 1970. The widespread cases of torture 
and other human rights abuses in Paraguay went unnoticed and unpunished for over twenty years 
(from 1954-1977). Citizens of a state that does not adhere to international human rights law were 
thus less protected than citizens of states that did ratify key treaties (Lutz, 643). In general, Lutz 
and Sikkink argue that the level of human rights varies within a state depending on the domestic 
legalization of international law. “Legalization,” they write, “[increases] the number of 
pathways…by multiplying the arenas within which human rights issues could be raised” (Lutz, 
658). 
 Adelman (2001) shares a similar view as to what affects the degree of realization of 
human rights, but his study focuses on the rights of refugee populations. Unlike Lutz and 
Sikkink, however, Adelman goes beyond studying international treaties; he claims that the level 
of refugee rights is only affected positively when an international body is present to enforce 
international law and adapt it to the current political situation. In other words, the existence of 
international law alone does not influence the level of rights a refugee population experiences. In 
his study of Jewish refugees seeking entry into Palestinian prior to and directly after World War 
II (WWII), Adelman argues that Jewish refugees were able to choose their nationality only after 
the International Refugee Organization (IRO) became involved.ii During the beginning of the 
conflict between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine, most surrounding states refused entry to 
Jewish refugees, regardless of whether or not the countries were signatories of international 
treaties on refugee rights. Great Britain (which held jurisdiction over Palestine at the time) 
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signed and created the British Balfour Declaration, which promised to establish a section of 
Palestine to serve as a “National Home for the Jewish people.” The reality of British treatment of 
the Jewish refugees was quite the opposite (Adelman 2001, 22-25). As Adelman writes: “As far 
as Britain and the Arabs were concerned, the wishes of refugees themselves counted for nothing. 
The rulings of international bodies counted for little more. Law and moral claims seemed to be 
mere backdrops” (Adelman 2001, 29).  British and Arab-Palestinian fears that Palestine would 
become a “Jewish state” were exacerbated when other countries refused to accept Jewish 
refugees and pressure mounted for them to be resettled in Palestine (Adelman 2001, 23). 
As the plight of the Jewish refugees worsened during and immediately after WWII, it 
became clear that the policy of permanent resettlement in a host country (which had been the 
dominant strategy of refugee aid previously) was not working. What needed to be addressed was 
the fear of a state being overrun by a refugee population. The IRO took upon itself the task of 
defining a state’s obligation toward refugees, determining what constituted refugee repatriation 
versus resettlement. In this way, refugees could be classified into two groups: those who needed 
temporary residence but could eventually be repatriated and those who could not return and had 
to be resettled into the host county. By redefining refugee populations in this way, the number of 
refugees that states thought they would have to resettle was dramatically reduced, thus making 
states more willing to open their doors to the Jewish refugees and other displaced persons after 
WWII (Adelman 2001, 29-30). Adelman demonstrates that international organizations, such as 
the IRO at the time, are not inflexible institutions; rather, they are able to adapt their strategies 
toward refugees based on dominant attitudes toward them in the international system.  Mere 
international law is unable to do this. In this way, Adelman argues that the level of rights 
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refugees experienced (in this case, the right to security and nationality) is determined by the 
extent to which an international body is involved and willing to adapt to the situation. 
Interestingly, Linda Camp Keith (1999) refutes findings such as Adleman, and Lutz and 
Sikkink. She argues that the empirical findings of the time were too insignificant to suggest that 
when an international treaty is involved, the level of human rights increases. To demonstrate this, 
Keith studied the effect that signing the ICCPR had on a state’s human rights performance, 
looking specifically at personal integrity rights. This is similar to Lutz’s and Sikkink’s study 
(2000), but rather than using qualitative case studies, Keith takes a quantitative approach. She 
analyzed the behavior of 178 states over an eighteen-year period (1976-1993) and found some 
statistically significant differences between states that ratified the ICCPR versus those that did 
not (Keith 1999, 95-96). When she analyzed differences in each state longitudinally (i.e., 
between its pre-treaty and post-treaty years), Keith found no statistically significant differences. 
Her findings suggest that factors others than affiliation with human rights treaties are the main 
determinants of the level of human rights protection (Keith 1999, 103-105). 
 The second approach to analyzing the level of human rights protection in a state centers 
on key factors in the domestic legal and political arena. Scholars working from a “domestic 
policy” approach study factors such as regime type, legal systems, and the economy. For 
example, Christian Davenport (1999) analyzed the effect of democratic regime change on human 
rights protection, using a sample of 137 states from 1950-1982. In general, he found that the 
“magnitude” of human rights violations decreased when a state transitioned from 
authoritarianism to democratic rule, but only for the four years immediately following the regime 
change. During the same period, Davenport also demonstrated that authoritarian rule increased 
the magnitude of human rights violations (Davenport 1999, 92-93). Davenport thus argues that 
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“changes in the level of democracy increase tolerance of decision makers who are held 
accountable, and increased democracy decreases the willingness and influence of coercive agents 
to push for repressive applications because of their altered relationship with the government as 
well as the citizenry” (Davenport 1999, 97). 
David Cingranelli, David Richards, and Ronald Gelleny also look at domestic level 
variables to study variations in human rights, but their results differ significantly from 
Davenport’s. Cingranelli and Richards (1999) researched how democratization affected the 
human right to personal security. They analyzed physical integrity rights, including protection 
from torture, illegal killings, disappearances, and political imprisonment in 79 states between the 
years 1981-1990 and 1991-1996. They then measured changes in human rights behavior during 
and following the Cold War (Cingranelli and Richards 1999, 511-513). Contrary to common 
expectations, Cingranelli and Richards determined that there was no significant change in a 
government’s human rights behavior caused by post-Cold War democratization and increased 
participation in the international economy (Cingranelli and Richards, 521). The right to 
protection from arbitrary arrest and detention (Article 9, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights) did correlate somewhat with domestic level changes made following the Cold 
War, but government adherence to this human right was short-lived and not universal. 
Cingranelli and Richards claim that “government respect for the right against political 
imprisonment from 1990-1996 was statistically significant” only in the regions of Asia, Africa, 
and Latin America. “In the remaining 46 countries, government respect for this right remained at 
Cold War levels” well into the 1990’s (Cingranelli and Richards, 525). In addition to this 
finding, they also contend that human rights improvements resulting from democratization are 
short-lived, mainly because many states do not democratize in response to internal pressure, but 
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to external pressure. Thus, once the external pressure or threat is removed, a state may resume its 
violations of human rights. 
In a similar article, Richards and Ronald Gelleny look at how democratic electoral 
systems affect a government’s respect for human rights. Richards and Gelleny (2007) conducted 
a study of more than 100 countries over nineteen years (1981-2000), analyzing the affect that 
elections in both the legislative and the presidential branches had on government respect for 
human rights. Interestingly, they found that legislative elections were positively correlated with 
respect for human rights, whereas the period following presidential elections was negatively 
associated with the protection of human rights (Gelleny and Richards 2007, 505-506). The 
authors attribute the causes of increased human rights respect in the years following a legislative 
election to the “deliberation” that is characteristically associated with this branch of government. 
Policy deliberation “increases the accountability of the executive with respect to human rights 
policymaking” (Gelleny and Richards, 508). This effect is not long-lived, however. Richards and 
Gelleny point out that, two years after the election, the relationship between respect for human 
rights and legislative elections is no longer valid (Gelleny and Richards 2007, 515). 
 Eric Neumayer is another “domestic policy” scholar, but he studies refugee rights and 
focuses on a different set of variables from the above scholars. Neumayer (2005) does not look 
directly at democracy, but rather at internal characteristics of a state. He explores how these 
internal factors affect domestic policies in order to explain variation in the rights that refugees 
experience. He focuses, in particular, on the right to choose one’s nationality by studying asylum 
recognition rates in Western Europe (Neumayer 2005, 43-44). Neumayer analyzed two causal 
factors within the refugee-receiving state: the number of asylum applications and the state’s 
economic condition. He also analyzed four factors characteristic of the refugee-sending state: the 
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presence of inter-ethnic conflict, human rights violations, political oppression, and the state’s 
economic condition (Neumayer 2005, 52-54). While he studied a variety of independent 
variables that could affect recognition rates in the host state, Neumayer found that asylum 
recognition rates are most influenced by the receiving state’s average income level and its rate of 
unemployment (i.e., economic conditions). When unemployment runs high and income level 
low, states are more likely to adopt asylum-restrictive policies in order to better protect their 
national populations (Neumayer 2005, 59). 
The third body of literature I assess, the “cultural attitudes” approach, focuses not on 
elite-level policymaking or institutions, but on popular-level perceptions of refugees.  Whereas 
the scholars discussed above focused on governmental policies (both international and domestic), 
“cultural attitudes” scholars analyze how the demands and sentiments of the domestic population 
influence policymaking. They would ask: “How do the citizens within a refugee-receiving state 
affect the level of rights refugees experience?” and would attempt to answer this question by 
studying perceptions regarding refugees in host communities, using such tools as public opinion 
surveys or interviews. 
I employ what I term a “cultural attitudes approach” in my own research on refugee 
rights in South Africa. This approach is currently underdeveloped by scholars in the human 
rights and refugee rights fields.iii I focus on the communities in which refugees actually live, 
concentrating on the attitudes of people who surround them and the impact of such attitudes on 
the rights refugees are able to realize in practice. In addition, by employing this approach, I can 
also study the informal mechanisms that influence the effectiveness of domestic policies and 
international law on refugee rights.  My aim is not to disregard the earlier two bodies of 
literature, but rather to show how cultural attitudes can influence the protection of refugee rights 
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significantly at the domestic and international levels.  This approach is uniquely suited to the 
case of South Africa, a country that has a high number of refugee rights instantiated in law yet 
one in which refugees still have trouble accessing and experiencing these rights in practice. The 
cultural attitudes approach offers the best tools to explain this phenomenon. 
 I use the term “cultural attitudes” to describe this approach for several reasons. First, the 
word “cultural” is borrowed from more general political science literature on political culture. By 
emphasizing the word “culture,” I hope to hearken back to this work. Political culture literature 
also borrows greatly from fields of anthropology and sociology, so by choosing this term, I hope 
to broaden the human rights implications of my research for other fields of study. Finally, by 
“culture” I do not wish to imply that culture is monolithic; not all those in my interview pool 
shared the same life style or customs, for example.  Granted, most societies are pluralistic, but, as 
David Elkins and Richard Simeon write: “One cannot function successfully in a society while 
remaining too far outside the norms, assumptions, and expectations of other people with whom 
one must deal regularly” (Elkins and Simeon 1979, 135). Nevertheless, while there are multiple 
ethnic groups and historic cultures in each state, the word “culture” is used in place of “public” 
or “societal” because it reinforces the notion that, within a given culture, each identity 
(regardless of racial or ethnic group distinction) soon merges with the attitudes of others in the 
community, forming a “cultural attitude.” 
 To begin, scholars of human rights have used the cultural attitudes approach to better 
understand the disparity in rights distribution.  Jorge Bustamante (2002) studied what he terms 
“power differentials” between refugees and citizens in their host country. Refugees are not 
commonly afforded as many political and civil rights as the citizens of a state, so nationals hold 
power over refugees in terms of their ability to influence domestic policy. Nationals can exploit 
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these differences in legal rights to the point of abusing the rights of the refugee population 
(Bustamante 2002, 344). Thus, Bustamante explains refugee rights in relation to a refugee 
population’s vulnerability vis a vis the host population. He argues that vulnerability “[derives 
from a] set of cultural elements (stereotypes, prejudices, racism, xenophobia, ignorance and 
institutional discrimination)” (Bustamante 2002, 339). The more the refugee population deviates 
from the national population’s norms (including differences in religion, language, and familiar 
structure), the greater its vulnerability (Bustamante 2002, 347). 
The power differential is exacerbated by government policies. “While a particular state 
might not accept a discriminatory behavior against foreigners/immigrants by its nationals,” 
Bustamante writes, “the distinction it makes in favor of the nationals by granting them rights not 
granted to the foreigner/immigrant might be socially processed as a basis for a power 
differential…” (Bustamante 2002, 343).  Notably, Bustamante claims that legislative policies in 
support of refugee rights are typically ineffective and unenforceable. Bustamante argues that the 
reaction of nationals to non-nationals residing in their country is more significant than formal 
policy protections (Bustamante 2002, 350-351). Bustamante’s emphasis on the salience of public 
attitudes rather than official policy distinguishes his approach from the previous two scholarly 
approaches (that is, the international policy and domestic policy approaches).  
Gaim Kibreab (2003) uses a similar approach to Bustamante’s to explain why refugee 
rights vary in a state. By studying the right to choose one’s nationality and the right to personal 
security, Kibreab explains variation in these rights as a function of public (national) opinion 
toward the security threat posed by refugees. According to Kibreab, public opinion determines 
refugees’ access to legal aid and fair asylum practices. For instance, the cost of a refugee status 
permit or an application for permanent residence should be within most refugees’ budgets and 
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the application process should not be made excessively difficult to execute. In Costa Rica, 
however, this has not been the case. Since Costa Ricans have had a negative impression of 
Nicaraguan and Salvadoran refugees, the right of Nicaraguans and Salvadorans to choose their 
nationality has been severely limited through costly application fees and a lack of legal 
assistance in filling out and submitting the applications (Kibreab 2003, 52-53). Thus, the right to 
chose one’s nationality has been limited by the national population’s opinion of the refugee 
group. 
Robert Putnam has also explored how cultural attitudes (or what he calls “Level II 
negotiations”) can shape the making of international law (Putnam 1988). While Putnam does not 
discuss the effects two level games might have on the realization of human rights, I include his 
work in this study because it breaks down the barrier dividing strictly comparative politics 
approaches and international relations approaches and demonstrates how they are actually 
mutually constituted. According to Putnam, there are two levels of negotiations: Level I 
negotiations and Level II discussion. Level I talks represent those between the negotiators, each 
actor trying to reach an agreement. They take place at the international level (for instance, as 
foreign trade negotiations between countries). Level II discussions occur between groups of 
“constituents” at the domestic policy level, who engage in negotiations over whether or not to 
ratify a Level I agreement. Putnam argues that in order for a Level I agreement to be successful, 
it must also “be ratified at Level II [which] imposes a crucial theoretical link between the two 
levels” (Putnam 1988, 436). Thus, in order for international laws (including human rights laws, 
such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) to be effective and the rights 
contained within them to be realized, constituentsiv must endorse and be prepared for the 
obligations set forth in the law. If this is not the case, as Putnam predicts and as I hypothesize, 
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international law will be less effective at the domestic level. Constituents at the domestic level 
can either reinforce international law (through mutual agreement on shared principles) or hinder 
its effectiveness (through a lack of personal agreement). Hence, Putnam’s study brings the value 
of the cultural attitudes approach full circle, and my application of his theory to refugee rights is 
my own contribution to human rights literature.   
 
 
III. Thesis Model and Hypothesis 
 
  Having looked at several schools of thought on factors affecting refugee rights, I have 
determined that the “cultural attitudes” approach is the most useful for analyzing the rights of 
refugees in Cape Town, South Africa. Scholars working from this perspective would argue that 
the host society’s perceptions of refugees determines the degree to which rights refugees are able 
to realize their rights. Hence, they separate the statutory rights refugees are granted in the host 
country (de jure) from the rights refugees are able to experience in their daily lives (de facto). 
Using this approach, the basic thesis model can be outlined as follows:  
 
Orientation of the host culture’s perceptions 
toward refugees (positive or negative)                Realization of refugee rights (high or low) 
 
 
 For this paper, I hypothesize that there is a direct causal relationship between orientation 
of cultural attitudes (the independent variable) and the realization of refugee rights (the 
dependent variable). When the host culture’s attitude toward refugees is positive, the realization 
of the refugee right is high; alternatively, when the host culture’s attitude toward refugees is 
negative, the realization of refugee rights is low. The causal link between the independent and 
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dependent variable is outlined in the diagram below. This diagram is also intended to lead the 
reader through the operationalization of the two variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
IV. Research Design 
   
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
(media and interview 
coding) 
 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
(media and interview 
coding) 
 
Part 1: The realization of 
the right to personal 
physical integrity (high) 
Part 2: The realization of 
the right to protection 
from unlawful detention 
(high) 
Part 1: The realization of 
the right to personal 
physical integrity (low) 
 
Part 2: The realization of 
the right to protection 
from unlawful detention 
(low)  
 
 Positive orientation 
Negative orientation 
 
The orientation of 
the host culture’s 
attitudes toward 
refugees 
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 I use the region of Cape Town, South Africa as a case study to test my hypothesis. South 
Africa is an appropriate country in which to conduct a case study for several reasons. To begin, 
South Africa has only recently become a refugee-receiving state. Until the end of National Party-
dominated rule and the subsequent fall of the Apartheid government in 1994, South Africa was a 
refugee-sending state. By 1996, however, once the African National Congress (ANC), led by 
President Nelson Mandela, fully came into power with a ratified Constitution, refugees from 
across the African continent and former exiles flooded the country. Suddenly, this long-time 
isolated nation was introduced to peoples from throughout Africa, whose distinctive languages, 
ethnicities, and cultural characteristics were forced into the lives of South African nationals. This 
led to xenophobia and the harboring of negative perceptions of refugees on two fronts (South 
African Information Service 2004). 
First of all, many of the former beneficiaries of the Apartheid government’s policies 
(those designated as “white”) felt as though they were losing their country and their privileges to 
people they had historically deemed less important than themselves. This included both South 
African nationals and refugee populations who would have been labeled as “black” by the 
Apartheid regime. On the other hand, those labeled as “coloured” and “black” during Apartheid 
felt threatened by the surge of refugees because refugees created competition for the resources 
(such as land, housing, and employment) only recently granted to these historically 
discriminated-against populations. Indicative of this sentiment by “black” or “coloured” South 
Africans is the frequent comment that “they [refugees] are here to steal our jobs”.v  
 Secondly, South Africa is an appropriate country in which to test my hypothesis because 
of its unique status as a developing state which does not have a refugee encampment system. 
After the fall of the Apartheid government and its policies, the new South African government, 
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under the African National Congress (ANC), advanced and intentionally integrated human rights 
in its policy-making. The aim was to overturn the mass human rights abuses that had 
characterized the republic until 1994 (Republic of South African Department of Home Affairs 
2004).  The post-Apartheid South African Constitution (1996) affords citizens extensive civil, 
political, and even economic rights. In the Bill of Rights, refugees are granted the same rights as 
citizens, with the exception of the right to vote (a political right) (Republic of South African 
Constitution 1996). This is quite different from the restrictive encampment systems many 
developing countries employ. In terms of research design, this unique situation allowed me to 
hold constant the statutory, or legal, rights given priority in both the domestic and international-
legal scholarly approaches in order to focus on cultural attitudes within the host society. 
South Africa is also a useful nation in which to test my hypothesis because of the appeal 
of the state to migrants. Asylum-seekers typically regard South Africa as a land of opportunity; it 
is one of the wealthiest nations on the continent and boasts the freedoms associated with stable 
leadership and democracy.vi Asylum-seekers are also often drawn to South Africa because of its 
self-proclaimed characteristic of being a “rainbow nation.” Asylum-seekers may be drawn to the 
multi-racial and multi-ethnic quality of South Africa, seeing the potential for greater opportunity 
to integrate than would be possible in another African nation.vii Whatever their reason for coming 
to South Africa, it is clear that refugees and asylum seekers have a large presence in this country. 
According to South African government statistics, South Africa’s total asylum-seeker and 
refugee population is 90,000 (South African Information Service 2004); statistics from the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in 2005 claim that there are 139,000 asylum-
seekers and 28,700 refugees (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2005).  
According to last year’s UNHCR report on “Global Trends” in migration during 2006, South 
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Africa was a “main destination for new asylum seekers,” with “53,400 new asylum seeker claims 
in 2006, one tenth of individual application globally.”  The same report also calls South Africa 
“one of the largest [asylum seeker] recipients in the world,” ahead of the United States (United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2007, 10).  Within South Africa, I focused my case 
study on the greater Cape Town region, which is home to one of South Africa’s five refugee-
reception centers. The city has a high volume of refugee traffic and a large number of refugees 
who choose to reside within Cape Town and its surrounding communities.  
 
A. Data Sources  
 Both the independent and dependent variables are measured through coded media reports, 
coded interview responses, and an assessment of NGO and government reports and surveys. In 
all, I coded 114 newspaper articles and 15 interviews, and assessed reports made by three 
different NGOs (both domestic and international) and one government commission. I also 
evaluated the findings of three national surveys. 
I coded the same media reports and interviews when operationalizing both the 
independent and dependent variables, in order to ensure the validity and replicability of the 
variables. Media coding plays a central part in the analysis of both variables. I coded 114 news 
articles published in nine local and four national English language papers that are distributed to 
the Cape Town public and available online. The criteria for selecting the news articles were: 1) 
that they mention either the word “refugee” or “asylum seeker” at least once in the article, and  
2) that the article only discussed refugees or asylum seekers living in South Africa or attempting 
to live in South Africa. All coded media reports were published between January 1, 2005 and 
January 1, 2008. 
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To operationalize both variables, I coded interviews with NGO and government 
employees. These interviews were conducted between April 30, 2007 and July 10, 2007 in Cape 
Town, South Africa.viii All of the interviews were conducted at the site of the NGO or the 
governmental office in the greater Cape Town region. A total of sixteen non-governmental 
employees were interviewed and audio-recorded (only 15 interviews could be coded, however, 
due to audio problems with one interview). There were twenty identifiable refugee service 
providers in Cape Town, so my sample pool is 15 out of 20, or 75 percent. While the size of the 
NGO sample pool was relatively large, a more comprehensive study would have included 
interviews with several members of each NGO, as it cannot be assumed that employee opinions 
are universal within each NGO. The time period and resources available for this research, 
however, only allowed for one interview per NGO. 
In the governmental sector, I was able to interview representatives of two agencies: one, a 
City of Cape Town official, the other a representative of the South African Department of Home 
Affairs (DHA). I concede that this is a small sample pool; however, due to the time and resource 
limits of this study, I was unable to convince more governmental employees to be interviewed. 
Moreover, the DHA restricted my ability to interview their employees by only allowing one 
representative to speak on behalf of the entire department. While the purpose of choosing these 
two interviews was to obtain opinions from both city and national government representatives, 
their views should not be taken as representative of the whole national or city government. A 
broader study would have also included interviews with several other governmental 
representatives, such as local political authorities and national legislators. Again, however, time 
and resource constraints made their inclusion impossible. 
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I selected interviewees based on their position within the NGO or government office and 
the duration of their employment. Interviews lasted an average of 45 minutes. Through a close 
network of personal references, I identified key NGOs involved in refugee service provision. By 
gaining rapport with two members of one large South African NGO – The Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) – I obtained names of other refugee service providers. I 
also spoke to refugees about the services they received and made an effort to speak with a 
representative of the NGOs they referenced. 
 I made a broad assessment of available NGO reports and surveys. In order to check for 
consistency between international and local views as well as NGO and government views, I 
analyzed reports from two international NGOs: Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Refugees 
International (RI).  I also assessed the reports from a domestic NGO: the Institute for Democracy 
in South Africa’s Southern African Migration Project (IDASA-SAMP).  And I evaluated reports 
produced by a government entity, the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC).  
 
B. Operationalization of the Independent Variable: 
 
 The independent variable, the orientation (positive or negative) of the host culture’s 
attitude toward a refugee group, is operationalized in two ways: 1) by coding media reports as 
well as semi-structured interviews with NGOs and government employees; and 2) by assessing 
NGO reports as well as secondary public opinion polls. Using these sources, I have developed an 
overall assessment of the attitudes South Africans hold toward asylum seekers and refugees (i.e., 
either positive or negative). 
I focused on the South African media as a source of data on these perceptions because 
newspaper articles are not only written by South African natives but also tend to reflect the views 
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of the general population (Crush 2000, 106, 124). The non-governmental Institute for 
Democracy in South Africa’s (IDASA) “Southern African Migration Project” (SAMP) has 
released two reports critiquing the South African media’s representation of African asylum-
seekers. Both reports stress that the media uses stereotypes already rampant in South African 
society (Danso and MacDonald 2000 and MacDonald and Jacobs 2005). As one report notes, a 
majority of the articles “reproduce racial and national stereotypes about migrants from other 
African countries, depicting — for example — Mozambicans as car thieves and Nigerians as 
drug smugglers” (Danso and MacDonald, 7).  SAMP researchers David MacDonald and Sean 
Jacobs (2005) code all English-medium media clippings from mid 2000 through early 2003, 
looking for “pro-immigration” versus “anti-immigration” terms and phrases (a total of 950 
articles were coded). Among other statistics, MacDonald and Jacobs found that 52% of the 
media used at least one negative reference, 22% associated migrants with crime, and 24% used 
negative metaphors to describe migration into South Africa, such as “flood,” “wave,” or 
“hordes” (MacDonald and Jacobs 2005, 1,16).  Kate Lefko-Everett, another SAMP researcher, 
stressed that the media reinforces the fears of and attitudes toward refugees already established in 
the South African public.ix  
In my research, coded media coverage has thus served as a central tool for measuring the 
attitudinal orientation of the South African public. I have also assessed NGO reports regarding 
xenophobia in the media (such as those written by SAMP) to enhance my discussion of the 
attitudinal measurement. 
First, I measured the orientation of the host culture’s attitude toward refugees and asylum 
seekers by coding the media reports using a set of coding rules (see Appendix [B]). I hand coded 
each newspaper article (for which the entire article served as the unit of analysis) for the number 
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of “positive,” “negative,” or “neutral” words or phrases that appear throughout the entire article, 
employing the established set of coding rules. (If no relevant words or phrases appear, the article 
was coded as “none.”)  If over 50% of the words or phrases in the article were “positive,” the 
article as a whole was labeled as “positive,” for expressing a positive attitude toward refugees 
and asylum seekers. If over 50% of the words or phrases in the article were “negative”, the 
article was labeled as “negative,” for expressing a negative attitude toward refugees and asylum 
seekers. If the article contained an equal number of positive and negative words or phrases, it 
was labeled as “neutral.”  If it could not be labeled as “positive,” “negative,” or “neutral,” based 
on the above criteria, it was labeled as “none.”  In addition, a second reader used the same set of 
coding rules to re-code 10% of the articles, in order to check for intercoder reliability. 
Finally, I assessed public attitudes using data from interviews conducted with South 
African domestic NGOs and South African governmental employees.  My aim in conducting 
NGO and government interviews was to gain a professional view of South African cultural 
attitudes toward refugee groups. The goal of these interviews was not to understand the 
individual attitudes of NGO or government employees. Rather, it was to evaluate how the 
interviewee would assess South African public attitudes toward refugees (positively or 
negatively). Questions such as “How integrated are refugees into South African society?” “Are 
any refugee populations more integrated than others?” and “How are refugees from different 
African states or regions perceived by the South African public?” offer to insight into the origins 
of public attitudes toward refugees in South Africa. The questions asked of both NGO and 
government employees are provided in Appendix [A]. 
To measure the interview component of the independent variable, I coded responses to a 
subset of questions for all interviews, and an overall score is assigned per interview based on 
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combined question scores. Similar to the coding employed for the media analysis, I code each 
interview response as “positive,” “negative,” “neutral,” or “none” by identifying repeated words 
or phrases established in a set of coding rules (see Appendix [C]).  If over 50% of the words or 
phrases in the interviewee’s response were “positive,” the response was labeled as “positive,” for 
expressing a positive attitude toward refugees and asylum seekers. If over 50% of the words or 
phrases were “negative,” the response was coded as “negative,” for expressing a negative 
attitude toward refugees and asylum seekers. If the response contained an equal number of 
positive and negative words or phrases, it was labeled as “neutral.”  If it could not be labeled as 
“positive,” “negative,” or “neutral,” based on the above criteria, it was labeled as “none.”  As in 
the media analysis, a second reader used the same set of coding rules that I developed to re-code 
10% of the interviews, in order to check for intercoder reliability. 
To fully measure the independent variable, the media and interview analyses were 
combined. If over 50% of all interviews and media reports were labeled as “positive,” then the 
overall orientation of the South African public toward refugees and asylum seekers were judged 
as a “positive attitudinal orientation.” If over 50% of all interviews and media reports were 
labeled as “negative,” then the overall orientation of the South African public was judged as a 
“negative attitudinal orientation.” If, however, there were an equal percentage of both interviews 
and media coded as “positive” and “negative,” then the attitude of the South African public was 
labeled as “neutral.” On the other hand, if the media reports and interviews contained no positive 
or negative references, the orientation of the South African public toward refugees was labeled 
as “none,” indicating that attitudes toward refugees and asylum seekers were not expressed. 
Finally, to supplement my coded analysis of the media and interview data, I assessed 
three national public opinion polls conducted by SAMP in 1998 and 1999.x This enabled me to 
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compare my findings to those generated from a large-N, national-level public opinion dataset.  
While the SAMP polls do not mirror the dates in which I conducted my research, they are the 
most current public opinion polls available on the topic of South African attitudes toward 
migrants.  Comparing data at multiple levels of analysis and over time will enable me to 
understand the dynamics of the evolution of cultural attitudes.  
 
 
 
 
 
C. Operationalization of the Dependent Variable 
 
The dependent variable, the realization of refugee rights, was operationalized by 
analyzing two rights granted to refugees in South Africa: the right to personal physical integrity 
and the right to protection from unlawful detention. Before discussing the dependent variable 
further, it is important to note here why the term “realization” was chosen. As noted earlier, 
South Africa grants a large number of statutory rights to its refugee population. By using the 
term “realization,” I am separating the legal rights afforded refugees (de jure) from the rights 
they are actually able to receive and use, or, “realize” (de facto). For the purposes of this study, a 
right was deemed as “realized” if the legal provisions of the right were experienced in high 
frequency among the studied refugee groups.xi I now look at the legal basis for these two rights 
and follow with a discussion of their operationalization. 
Article 4 of the African Charter (1981) states: “Human beings are inviolable.  Every 
human being shall be entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may 
be arbitrarily deprived of this right” (Organization of African Unity 1981). This describes the 
right to personal physical integrity, or the right to security of the person. Like the right to non-
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discrimination, this right is articulated in a variety of international laws, including The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (Article 9) (1966) and the African 
Charter (Article 4) (Organization of African Unity 1981). In this way, refugees, asylum seekers, 
and those awaiting status determination who reside in South Africa are granted protection from 
physical harm. 
The right to protection from unlawful detention is framed in a variety of international 
laws, though not as clearly defined as the rights to non-discrimination and to physical integrity.  
Article 17 of the ICCPR states that “No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful 
interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his 
honour and reputation” and stipulates the right to protection from the law if such a violation 
should occur. Article 26 grants equal protection from the law (1966).  In the Convention on the 
Status of Refugees (hereafter: the 1951 Refugee Convention), Articles 31 and 32, taken together, 
ensure protection for both undocumented refugees as well as those legally staying in the country.  
Article 31 states that undocumented refugees should not be penalized, “provided they present 
themselves without delay to the authorities and show good cause for their illegal entry or 
presence.” Article 32 states that refugees lawfully in the host country should not be expelled, 
except in an established case of national security or public order (1951). Taking together these 
articles from the ICCPR and the 1951 Refugee Convention, I argue that refugees and asylum 
seekers have the right against arbitrary arrest, the right not to be detained if they have status 
documentation, and the right to apply for status documentation or await status determination 
before detention. In all, this is defined as the right to protection from unlawful detention.  
In order to measure the realization of the right to personal physical integrity, I have 
analyzed the number of violent attacks or discriminatory acts made against refugees that are 
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reported in the media, mentioned in interviews conducted with representative of NGOs and 
government agencies, and described in secondary public opinion data. I have coded all media 
coverage that mentions refugees, looking for references to violent attacks or discriminatory acts 
made against refugees based on xenophobic causes or causes described as racially, ethnically, 
culturally, or religiously motivated.  
I coded all related media reports using a standard set of coding rules (see Appendix D).  
If over 50% of the words or phrases in the article were coded as “high realization,” the article as 
a whole was labeled as “high,” for expressing a high realization of the right to personal physical 
integrity. If over 50% of the words or phrases in the article were coded as “low realization,” the 
article as a whole was labeled as “low,” for expressing a low realization of the right to personal 
physical integrity.  Articles that shared an equal number of “high” and “low” criteria was labeled 
as “neutral.”  Articles that met none of the above requirements were coded as “none.” 
To measure the interview component of the dependent variable, I also coded responses to 
a subset of questions for all interviews, and an overall score was assigned per interview based on 
combined question scores. Similar to the coding employed for the media analysis, I hand coded 
each interview response as “high,” “low,” “neutral,” or “none” by identifying repeated words or 
phrases established in a set of coding rules (see Appendix E).  If over 50% of the words or 
phrases in the interviewee’s response were “high,” the response was labeled as “high 
realization,” for expressing a high realization of the right to personal physical integrity. If over 
50% of the words or phrases were “low,” the response was coded as “low realization,” for 
expressing a low realization of the right to personal physical integrity. If the response contained 
an equal number of “high” and “low” words or phrases, it was labeled as “neutral.”  If it could 
not be labeled as “positive,” “negative,” or “neutral,” based on the above criteria, it was labeled 
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as “none.”  As in the media analysis, a second reader used the same set of coding rules to re-code 
10% of the interviews, in order to check for intercoder reliability. 
To measure the overall realization of the right to personal physical integrity, I combined 
the scores of both the media reports and interview responses. If over 50% of the media and 
interview responses were coded as “high,” I assessed the right to personal physical integrity 
being highly realized. If over 50% of the media and interview responses were coded as “low,” I 
assessed the right to personal physical integrity having a low realization. If there were an equal 
number of media and interview responses coded as “high” and “low,” then I assessed the 
realization of the right to personal physical integrity as neutral. Alternatively, if the media reports 
and interviews contained no positive or negative references, the realization of the right to 
personal physical integrity was labeled as “none,” indicating that this right was not discussed. 
To augment the media and interview content analysis, I used national public opinion data 
gathered through several surveys conducted by the South African Migration Project (SAMP) in 
1998 and 1999.  In these polls, respondents were asked questions such as “To what extent do you 
agree that refugees should be granted police protection?” Due to the manner in which these polls 
were conducted, I analyzed the number of respondents who answered “always,” “sometimes,” or 
“never;” a “none” category was not included in the SAMP questionnaires.xii 
To measure the right to protection from unlawful detention, I coded interviews and media 
reports and assessed documents by NGOs and the South African government that refer to illegal 
arrest, detention, repatriation, or deportation. For the media analysis, I hand coded all media 
reports, looking for the mention of refugee arrest and detention. I coded each media article as 
“high,” “low,” “neutral,” or “none” by identifying repeated words or phrases established in a set 
of coding rules (see Appendix F).  If over 50% of the words or phrases in the article were “high,” 
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the response was labeled as “high realization,” for expressing a high realization of the right to 
protection from unlawful detention. If over 50% of the words or phrases were “low,” the article 
was coded as “low realization,” for expressing a low realization of the right to protection from 
unlawful detention. If the article contained an equal number of “high” and “low” words or 
phrases, it was labeled as “neutral.”  If it could not be labeled as “positive,” “negative,” or 
“neutral,” based on the above criteria, it was labeled as “none.”  
I also coded a subset of responses garnered through interviews conducted with NGOs and 
government employees, using a list of coding rules (see Appendix G). I used the same 
“high/low/neutral/none” measurement criteria described above to score a subset of interview 
responses and to give each interview an overall coding score. To measure the overall right to 
protection from unlawful detention, I combined the scores of the media reports and the interview 
responses. If over 50% of the media reports and interviews were coded as “high,” I assessed the 
right to protection from unlawful detention as being highly realized.  If over 50% of all media 
reports and interviews were coded as “low,” I assessed the right to protection from unlawful 
detention having a “low realization.” If there were an equal number of media and interview 
responses coded as “high” and “low,” then I assessed the realization of the right to protection 
from unlawful detention as neutral. Alternatively, if the media reports and interviews contained 
no positive or negative references, the realization of the right to protection from unlawful 
detention was labeled as “none,” indicating that this right was not discussed.  In addition to 
coding the interviews and media reports, I also assessed reports of illegal detention of refugees 
residing in South Africa as compiled by Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Refugees 
International (RI) as well as reports and recommendations made by the South African Human 
Rights Commission (SAHRC), a government entity.  
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 I augmented analysis of the dependent variable with field notes from refugee-dense areas 
as well as personal anecdotes from refugees and asylum seekers. From April through July 2007, I 
had discussions with 36 refugees and asylum-seekers. These anecdotes shed light on life 
experiences of refugees in South Africa. They also help to explain the causal link between public 
opinion and the realization of refugee rights, as these personal accounts help illuminate the 
dynamics of the refugee experience in Cape Town. While these anecdotes are not meant to 
measure the dependent variable, they convey to the reader a personal point of view from 
refugees. In addition, I draw on observations compiled in field notes from several areas sought 
out by asylum-seekers and refugees (including orphanages, homeless shelters, and food and 
clothing donation centers) to describe the realization of refugee rights. Again, this section will 
not add to the measurement of the dependent variable, but serves to add an analytic depth to the 
discussion. 
V. Empirical Findings 
 
 The empirical findings for both the independent and dependent variables did not indicate 
a strong connection between the two variables: all of the variables were coded as “none,” based 
on aggregate word counts using the coding rules. However, the second highest category for both 
the dependent and independent variables was “negative” or “low,” meaning that those who did 
express an opinion regarding either cultural attitudes or the realization of rights included in the 
dependent variable had a “negative” opinion of refugees or considered refugee rights to be “low” 
in terms of realization.  The figures on page 33 graphically display these findings.  
The findings for the independent variable (the orientation of cultural attitudes) are 
particularly interesting, as they indicate some negative biases toward refugees in South African 
media reporting. Since journalists are supposed to be unbiased, it is to be expected that the 
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majority of media articles would be coded as “none.” However, the fact that a large number of 
articles were coded as expressing a “negative” attitude toward refugees is significant, as 
journalists appear to have allowed their negative personal biases to influence their reporting.  
Interview coding results also indicate a tendency toward negative attitudes.  For the interview 
component of the independent variable’s measurement, a majority of the people interviewed 
responded that South African cultural attitudes toward refugees are “negative.” (Interviewees 
were directly asked about South African cultural attitudes toward refugees, allowing fewer 
interviews to be coded as “none.”) 
For the dependent variable, however, interviewees were not explicitly asked about the 
realization of either right. This led to a high instance of interviews coded as “none.” Since most 
of the media articles coded did not focus on stories of refugees whose safety was threatened or 
who were illegally deported, a majority of media articles were also coded as “none” for the 
dependent variable. As seen from the independent variable coding, however, when an opinion 
was expressed, it tended to be that the realization of the right was “low,” not “high.” This finding 
is stronger for the realization of the right to personal physical integrity than it is for the 
realization of the right to protection from unlawful detention. This may be because the right to 
protection from unlawful detention is administrative in nature and thus most likely to be abused 
by South African government officials. Hence, public and media awareness of the abuse of this 
right may be lower than awareness of physical violence against refugees in the public sphere.  
  
A. Independent Variable Findings 
 
 For the interview component of the independent variable’s measurement, the overall 
result is that people interviewed viewed South Africa’s cultural orientation toward refugees to be 
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negative. There were a total of 101 negative words and phrases that appeared in all fifteen coded 
interviews, followed by 70 neutral words or phrases.  
In fact, there were more words and phrases coded as “none” (for words and phrases that 
were factual or not germane to the project) than there were positive words or phrases: there were 
46 instances of words or phrases coded as “none,” while there were 30 instances of words or 
phrases coded as “positive.” 
In all, a total of 11 interviews were coded as “negative” (73%), 3 coded as “neutral” 
(20%) and one interview coded as “positive” (6%).  I used a 50% threshold to determine the 
coding results (i.e.: if greater than 50% of the words or phrases were positive, for example, then 
entire interview would be coded as positive). All interviewees expressed a view regarding the 
orientation of South African cultural attitudes, so no interviews were coded as “none.” (Refer to 
Figure 2 to see the frequency of interviews coded as “positive, negative, or neutral.”)  Out of the 
13 interviews with NGO representatives, 10 were coded as negative, one as positive, and 2 as 
neutral. Out of the 2 interviews with government representative, one interviewee expressed an 
overall “negative” view of South African cultural attitudes toward refugees, while the other 
government representative expressed a neutral view.xiii 
While interviewees clearly held that South African cultural attitudes toward refugees 
were negative, the results for the media component of the independent variable measurement 
were not as clear, though there is still a distinct divide between “positive” and “negative” cultural 
attitudes expressed in the media. Of the 114 media articles coded, 61 of them (or 54%) were 
coded as “none,” for not expressing views germane to the topic of cultural attitudes. Often, 
though articles did have instances of “positive” or “negative” words or phrases, the articles 
expressed many more facts general than opinions, thus leading to over 50% of the words or 
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phrases to being coded as “none.”  Though a majority of the articles were coded as “none,” this 
measurement was followed closely by those articles coded as “negative”: 44 out of the 114 
coded articles (or 39%) were coded as “negative.” On the other hand, 5 articles were coded as 
“positive,” and 4 articles coded as “neutral.” Figure 3 graphically represents the overall results of 
the media coding.xiv 
Having discussed both the media and interview components of the independent variable, 
I can now combine both components in order to fully measure the orientation of South African 
cultural attitudes toward refugees. Figure 4 demonstrates the results of this combined coding.  
 Overall, I coded 129 interviews and media articles;  61 were coded as none (47%), while 
55 were coded as “negative” (43%).  Since I continue to use a threshold of 50% to measure the 
independent variable, the independent variable is thus coded as “none.” Notably, only 4.7% were 
coded as “positive.”   
 
B. Dependent Variable 
 
 As explained in the “Research Design,” my dependent variable – the realization of 
refugee rights – is a function of two rights:  the right to physical integrity and the right to 
protection from unlawful detention. The interview component of the operationalization of the 
first part of the dependent variable, the right to personal physical integrity, was coded overall as 
“none.” Of the 15 interviews coded, there were 9 interviews coded as “none” (or 60%) and 6 
coded as “low” (or 40%), indicating a low realization of the right to personal physical integrity. 
No interviews were coded as “high” or “neutral.” Figure 5 portrays the interview coding results. 
Although the interviews must be coded as “none” for the first dependent variable, it is 
still significant to note that, of those articles that did express an attitude regarding the realization 
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of the right to personal physical integrity, all expressed that there was a low realization of this 
right.  It is also important to note that interviewees were not specifically asked questions  
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regarding the right to personal physical integrity (see Appendix A for questions asked of 
interviewees), so it is significant that interviewees mentioned a low realization of the right, at all.  
In order to avoid an abundance of interviews coded as “none” in the future, interviewees should 
be asked specific questions regarding the safety and security of refugees in South Africa.  
The results of the media coding were similar to the interview results. Here, 86 of the 114 
articles (or 75%) were coded as “none,” while 28 out of 114 (25%) were coded as “low,” for 
expressing a low realization of the right to personal physical integrity. Like the interview results, 
no media articles were coded as “high” or “neutral.” Figure 6 shows the results of the media 
coding. 
It should also be noted that, since all media articles that mentioned the word “refugee” or 
“asylum seeker” in South Africa were coded for the dependent variable, it was common for an 
article to be coded as “none” because the subject matter of the article did not address refugee 
safety or security at all. Of those articles that did specifically address matters of refugees’ 
physical security, it is important to note that more articles were coded as “low” than “high,” 
indicating that the right to personal physical integrity is still under threat to some degree.  
 When the coding results for both the interview and media components of the first 
dependent variable are combined, the overall realization of the right to personal physical 
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integrity can be coded. Figure 7 graphically displays this combined coding result.  Of the 129 
interviews and media articles coded, 95 interviews and articles were coded as “none” (74%) and 
34 were coded as “low” (26%).  Therefore, the realization of the right to personal physical 
integrity must be coded as “none.” 
Coding the second part of the dependent variable, the right to protection from unlawful 
detention, produced similar results, with a majority of both the interviews and media articles 
being coded as “none.”  In the case of the interviews, 14 of the 15 interviewees (93%) did not 
express an opinion regarding the right to protection from unlawful detention and were thus coded 
as “none.” One interviewee did discuss this right to protection from unlawful detention (without 
being directly questioned about it), but this interviewee’s response was coded as “neutral” 
(6.7%). Figure 8 displays the results of the interview coding for the second dependent variable. 
For the media coding, a higher percentage of those articles coded were coded as “low” 
(15%), but those articles coded as “none” still dominated (94 out of 114, or 82%).  Though three 
articles were coded as neutral (2.6%), none were coded as “high.”  Figure 9 graphically 
represents this data. 
 The overall measurement of the second dependent variable is shown in Figure 10. Since 
84% of the total articles and interviews coded were coded as “none,” the right to protection from 
unlawful detention is thus coded as “none.” However, it is still important to note that 13% of the 
total interviews and media articles coded held that the realization of the right to protection from 
unlawful detention was “low.”  It is significant that, although most media articles did not center 
on stories of illegal detention, when the issue was referenced, it was asserted that refugees were 
at risk of illegal arrest, detention and repatriation or deportation. No media articles or interviews 
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held that refugees in South Africa were safe from illegal detention and arrest, detention, and 
repatriation or deportation.  
VI. Assessment of Other Data 
 
 Having attempted to test my hypothesis in a more quantitative manner and not been able 
draw any strong conclusions about the realization of refugee rights in South Africa, I then 
engaged in a qualitative assessment of additional data in order to test my hypothesis. In this 
section of the paper, I discuss my field notes and analysis of reports written by both international 
and domestic NGOs as well as by the South African government entity, the South African 
Human Rights Commission (SAHRC). 
 The field notes draw on my informal conversations with refugees and asylum-seekers in 
South Africa help to shed personal light on the situation of migrants in South Africa.  The 
secondary sources from NGOs and the South African government specifically address the 
independent and dependent variable measured in this study; these reports address cultural 
attitudes, arrest and detention of refugees, and attacks on physical security and are uninhibited by 
the noise in my quantitative data. 
 
A. Assessment of Primary Sources: Notes from the Field 
 
My hypothesis that South African cultural attitudes toward refugees are negative and that 
refugee rights are unrealized is informed by my experience of living in Cape Town, South Africa 
in 2007. Here, I heard personal accounts of the difficulties many asylum seekers and refugees 
living in the greater Cape Town region faced. This section of the paper aims to share some of 
these accounts with the reader.xv 
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One of my impressions from having conversations with asylum seekers and refugees 
living in Cape Town was that most felt unsafe, although most did not attribute their lack of safety 
explicitly to their status as foreigners. Some mentioned that they had difficultly finding 
affordable housing because they did not want to move into the townships (informal settlements) 
because the locals would attack them for being “black foreigners.” For this reason, many moved 
into crowded dwellings in suburbs of Cape Town, such as Claremont, Kensington, or Wyneberg. 
Others who could not find friends to live with remained homeless or stayed in shelters. 
Some refugees commented that it was “unsafe” to walk around. One asylum seeker 
referred to it as the “gangster” problem in South Africa. Another specifically said that South 
Africa had a lot of crimes and robberies and that he felt he would be attacked due to this 
frequency of crime, regardless of whether he was a foreigner or not.  Many felt unsafe to walk 
around alone and, in response to this fear, circulated with bands of fellow refugees. Ironically, 
doing so may actually exacerbate their insecurity because South African nationals perceive the 
refugees as gangs of foreigners, possibly committing crime.  
Most refugees complaints about feeling unsafe in Cape Town resulted from having been 
attacked by the police or immigration officials, or knowing friends who experienced attacks. 
(Before describing these attacks, it should be noted that most refugees who said they felt unsafe 
in Cape Town nevertheless considered Cape Town to be safer than other cities in South Africa, 
especially Johannesburg, or other African countries in which they sought refuge, such as Kenya, 
Tanzania, or Namibia.)  The accounts of attacks against refugees’ personal physical integrity are 
revealing of the state of this right in South Africa.  
One refugee recounted being robbed and shot at in his home in Maitlands. While it was 
South African locals who attacked him, what was equally troubling to the refugee was the police 
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response to this attack. When this asylum seeker called the police, they responded to the call but 
did not file a report. Instead, police told the refugee that he should move out or else other 
“gangsters” would come. After this episode, he stayed homeless for a while or lived between 
shelters until a friend from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) allowed him to stay in his 
home.  This refugee seemed accepting of the police’s lack of protection, saying: “We are 
refugees. The government doesn’t support us.” Of South African citizens, he said: “[South 
Africans] would just kill you for nothing…they don’t respect our rules or our rights in South 
Africa.” His sentiments express that the government and its people care only about the rights and 
well-being of South African citizens. 
Although the preceding story involved attacks against physical integrity both by police 
and by citizens, the majority of stories related to me focused on abuse by the police rather than at 
the hands of common South African citizens. One refugee, for instance, told a story of the police 
“accidentally” arresting him for not having any legal documents to verify his asylum status, and 
then releasing him after two weeks once they realized it was a mistake to have arrested him. 
Another refugee, who said he felt unsafe in South Africa, told me how he questioned his reasons 
for coming to a country where “there are so many killings.” This asylum seeker had been robbed 
at knifepoint three times and held at gunpoint by the police once, having been misidentified as a 
murderer that the police sought to arrest. A similar “mistaken criminal” account was related by 
another refugee whose friend, a fellow asylum seeker, was burned with cigarettes by the police 
while under interrogation for a crime he did not commit. He was released a few days later, after 
the police realized their mistake.  
 Another refugee mentioned that while waiting in line for his status documentation at the 
Department of Home Affairs (DHA) in Cape Town one day, he saw an immigration official push 
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the asylum seekers into different lines using a stick. When he questioned her actions, she 
responded: “I need to do this; they are like animals.” This abuse of human dignity, as displayed 
by a government official, may jeopardize the right to personal physical integrity, among other 
refugee rights.   
 Another impression that I received from speaking with asylum seekers and refugees was 
that this population generally feared arrest, detention, and possible deportation (or repatriation) 
while awaiting status documentation from the DHA. Many heard rumors that those without 
documentation were deported during the hours that the Department of Home Affairs was closed. 
While some of these rumors may have been unfounded, they nevertheless instilled considerable 
fear among the refugee population. In one case, a group of refugee boys living in an orphanage 
were afraid of leaving the school grounds for fear of repatriation, as the older brother of one of 
the boys had been repatriated to Angola when he left the orphanage to renew his expired permit 
at the DHA. Having heard this story, the refugee children (many of whom had expired 
documentation) did not want to venture off the premises to renew their permits or go to school 
(despite the fact that access to schooling was one of their main reasons for coming to South 
Africa). 
Other refugees said that it was not uncommon for the police to raid homes, demanding to 
see documentation because they suspected the inhabitants to be illegal migrants. Surprisingly, the 
refugees telling this story seemed to be relatively unsettled about this common occurrence and 
had begun to accept it as a way of life in South Africa. Despite these police raids, however, the 
asylum seekers giving this account said that they felt safe in South Africa.  
Some asylum seekers specifically commented on the problems they faced without timely 
documentation owing to the backlog in processing applications within the DHA. One foreigner 
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who had received permanent residence in South Africa said that he thought the DHA’s slow 
documentation results violated all refugee rights.  A conversation with a DHA official was 
telling. She admitted that, on the day we spoke, the DHA had only taken in 16 new asylum cases; 
their goal is to take in about 160 per day. Among the refugees with whom I spoke, it took 
anywhere between three months to two years to obtain refugee status. Many who received it 
earlier admitted that they had lied on their applications or bribed officials to get a better place in 
a waiting line outside the DHA or to have their application reviewed sooner. 
Some mentioned that it was hard to return to the DHA (either to renew paperwork or to 
resubmit an application) because they lacked the money for transport to get to a DHA office. The 
lack of transportation money was mainly a problem among unaccompanied minors seeking 
refugee status in South Africa. Others complained that they did not have enough money to bribe 
officials who chose which refugees would be seen each day at the Department of Home Affairs, 
so they considered it pointless to go. One asylum seeker said that he had to return to the DHA 
five times to renew a permit, saying: “It’s like they don’t see you!” Many asylum seekers who 
were still in the process of getting documentation from the DHA (or had been denied asylum) 
complained that South Africa was corrupt. Bribery of officials was frequently mentioned. 
However, most refugees seemed to agree that once they had received their status documentation, 
life became easier in terms of making money, securing jobs and housing, or getting an education. 
 After speaking with asylum seekers, I was also often left with the impression that there is 
a general lack of awareness about their own rights as asylum seekers or refugees. Many asylum 
seekers or refuges I met who were staying in orphanages or emergency shelters were surprised to 
learn that they could not be denied housing or a job simply because they were foreigners. One 
refugee from the DRC suggested that the lack of rights awareness was partly caused by a 
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refugee’s difficulty in obtaining information about South African laws, especially in his native 
language. So, when refugees are told that something is illegal and that they will be arrested, few 
speak out against it. This refugee hoped to publish a French-language newsletter featuring news 
from his home country (the DRC) and translated South African laws, to benefit his countrymen. 
The few refugees who did learn about their rights usually did so from a fellow refugee who came 
from the same country, not from an official publication. As one asylum seeker explained to me: 
“Even now, I don’t know my rights as a refugee.” Another said: “All I know is that I am 
supposed to be living normally, like everyone else,” showing that he knew he was generally 
protected, but would not have been able to specify what rights he had in case they were 
threatened. Others claimed that they knew they had “freedoms,” but could not specify what that 
meant to them.  Despite a general awareness of freedoms in South Africa, most asylum seekers 
and refugees did not seem able to claim their guaranteed rights in the event that South African 
civilians, the police, or the government put them at risk.  
 Few refugees directly mentioned problems with xenophobia or a negative attitude toward 
them among South Africans. One man mentioned that he was worried that he did not have 
enough in common with South Africans to feel at home in the country. Others commented that 
learning English (a service that seemed widely accessible to most refugees) helped them to fit in 
more. Compared to an encampment system, most asylum seekers and refugees thought that they 
were better integrated in South Africa than they would be in another refugee-receiving country. 
However, fears of or problems with xenophobia were also present during conversations with 
these asylum seekers.  One refugee from the DRC, for instance, said that citizens still made 
xenophobic threats toward refugees in the streets and at the workplace. He said that he felt some 
level of xenophobia had decreased once Angolan refugees were repatriated, however. 
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 For refugees, the largest obstacle to feeling equal to South Africans seemed to be the 
stigma attached to their identification documents. Refugee status identification documents are 
green in color, as distinct from the red identification cards South African citizens and permanent 
residents hold. Asylum permits are large white sheets of paper. When refugees tried to apply for 
jobs, schooling, or access social services such as medical care, these documents had to be 
presented and refugees were often discriminated against because of them. One refugee 
commented that when he showed people his green ID, he was immediately discriminated against 
because people thought he was illegally residing in the country. “Xenophobia is not just a word 
in the dictionary,” he said, “but a reality for us [refugees].”  From these conversations, it seems 
as though xenophobia is not solely to blame, but also a lack of awareness on the part of South 
African citizens as to what constitutes legal documentation and the rights associated with those 
who carry such documents.  
 
B. Assessment of Secondary Sources: International and Domestic NGO and Government 
Reports 
 
 When assessing NGO reports from both domestic and international NGOs as well as a 
South African government body, it is important to note that al of these entities draw similar 
conclusions regarding cultural attitudes toward refugees in South Africa and the lack of 
realization of certain refugee rights. I begin by analyzing what two international NGOs – 
Refugees International (RI) and Human Rights Watch (HRW) – are saying about the situation of 
refugees in South Africa, and then move on to discuss how their assessments concur with what 
domestic entities, both at the government and non-governmental level, are saying about refugees 
living in South Africa. 
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 In late 2007, Refugees International issued a report entitled “Zimbabwe Exodus: Too 
Little, but Not Too Late.” Although the main point of this report was to inform the international 
community (especially those states in southern Africa) about the current needs of Zimbabwean 
fleeing their homeland due to the economic crisis in Zimbabwe, the study also details cases and 
suspicion of illegal deportations of Zimbabwean refugees, including cases where South Africa is 
suspected of illegally repatriating refugees.  RI specifically cited South Africa and Botswana for 
deporting large numbers of undocumented migrants, “largely targeting Zimbabweans” (Refugees 
International 2007, 2). The reasons for these repatriations is that many migrants cross the border 
illegally or are suspected of being economic migrants and not asylum seekers, and are thus 
immediately arrested, detained, and then sent back across the border to Zimbabwe, where they 
often face arrest at the hands of Zimbabwean security forces. According to South African 
immigration law, however, refugees have two weeks once in the country to apply for asylum or 
seek legal documentation before being arrested and deported, and South African government 
officials are required to inform undocumented migrants of this right.xvi Although RI did not 
comment on South African officials’ fulfillment of their obligation to inform migrants of their 
rights, the large numbers of Zimbabweans being deported (150,000 were deported between 
January and May, 2007, before the RI report was issued) raises concerns about the realization of 
the right to protection from unlawful detention. The report specifically commented on the South 
African Department of Home Affairs’ (DHA) inability to effectively process large amount of 
asylum applications and the effects this inability has on refugee rights, such as the right to 
protection from unlawful detention. Zimbabweans also file the most asylum applications in 
South Africa (according to this report). RI asserts that the DHA backlog “has led to legal 
irregularities and protection concerns. These range from transgression of migrants’ rights at 
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refugee reception offices to arbitrary detention and deportations” (Refugees International 2007, 
3). 
 Human Rights Watch has issued two reports on the state of asylum seekers and refugees 
in South Africa, one in 1998 and the other in 2005. The earlier report, entitled “Prohibited 
Persons: Abuse of Undocumented Migrants, Asylum Seekers, and Refugees in South Africa,” 
discusses the high levels of xenophobia toward foreigners in South Africa (which related to my 
independent variable). The report also concentrates on the physical abuses against asylum 
seekers by government representative, police, and citizens, which relates to the first dependent 
variable, the realization of the right to personal physical integrity (Human Rights Watch 1998).   
 Based on interviews with representative of the government and military, as well 
as South African citizens in 1996 and 1997 in several South African cities and towns that 
border other southern African nations, HRW found South Africa to be a highly 
xenophobic country. The report opens by stating: 
 
Although South Africa, since the first democratic elections in 1994, has made 
remarkable progress towards establishing a free and democratic society based on 
respect for the human rights of its own citizens, foreigners have largely failed to 
benefit from these developments and remain subject to serious abuse. Anti-
foreigner feelings have also increased alarmingly. Politicians, the press, and the 
South African public commonly blame foreigners for exacerbating social 
problems such as rising crime, unemployment, or even the spread of diseases, 
and undocumented migrants have been subject to abuse by officials from the 
Department of Home Affairs, the police, and the army, as well as by the general 
public (Human Rights Watch 1998, section I). 
 
The report goes on to detail trends developing in South Africa that led the organization to 
conclude that South Africa was a xenophobic nation. One such trend is the tendency for public 
officials to openly blame refugees and asylum seekers for problems within the country, though 
there is no proof of any such connection between increasing numbers of migrants and the socio-
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economic problems burdening South Africa. Such “unsubstantiated and inflammatory 
statements” include blaming migrants for increased crime, increased drug dealing and drug use 
loss of job opportunities for nationals, and the proliferation of diseases (Human Rights Watch 
1998, sections I and VI).  HRW was highly critical of South African government officials who, 
in public statements, have accused migrants of adding to South Africa’s economic problems. A 
public address made by the former Minister of Home Affairs, Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, is a 
good example of xenophobic remarks at the government level. In a budget address in 1997, 
Buthelezi stated: “With an illegal population estimated at between 2.5 million and 5 million, it is 
obvious that the socio-economic resources of the country, which are under severe strain as it is, 
are further being burdened by the presence of illegal aliens. The cost implication becomes even 
clearer when one makes a calculation suggesting that if every illegal costs our infrastructure, say 
1000 rands [U.S. $ 200] per annum, then multiplied with whatever number you wish, it becomes 
obvious that the cost becomes billions of rands per year.” Other government officials have 
claimed that, in order to combat South Africa’s high crime rate, “illegal immigrants” must be 
deported. Migrants are also frequently referred to as “illegal” or “illegal aliens” and “criminals” 
during public speeches, with no attempt to divide migrants into more accurate groups (i.e., 
asylum seekers, economic migrants, and undocumented migrants) (Human Rights Watch 1998, 
section VI).   
Human Rights Watch’s 1998 report also details physical attacks on refugees. Sometimes, 
these attacks are made by South African citizens because migrants are considered “easy targets” 
since many nationals assume that migrants will not go to the police for protection or to report a 
crime.  Moreover, HRW claims that the South African police and government officials hold a 
similar disregard for the physical protection of migrants, including those both illegally and 
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legally residing in the country. HRW describes several cases of abuse at the hands of the South 
African police and employees of the Department of Home Affairs which were filed by asylum 
seekers.  One Angolan refugee described being arbitrarily arrested, handled roughly by the 
police, and not told where she was going or for what reason. Another Nigerian refugee described 
being harassed and physically abused by the police when he asked to see proof that they were 
police officers after the officers required the man in question to present his legal documents. The 
assault by the police resulted in bruises covering his legs and cuts on his wrists from the 
handcuffs (Human Rights Watch 1998, section V). 
This HRW report also draws a connection between the independent and dependent 
variables that the empirical section of this paper was unable to conclusively prove.  That is, 
HRW proves there is a link between xenophobia (or negative cultural attitudes toward refugees) 
and physical abuse of migrants (or low realization of the right to personal physical integrity). The 
report explicitly states: “A xenophobic climate in South Africa has resulted in increased 
harassment of migrants. Many people interviewed by Human Rights Watch described how they 
had been verbally abused by South Africans, and told to ‘go home.’ In some cases, verbal abuse 
led to physical attacks.” HRW then goes on to detail specific instances when refugee 
interviewees were specifically targeted by South African nationals in an attempt to rid their state 
of non-citizens. Often, these attempts involved physical assaults by gangs of South Africans 
against individual refugees. For instance, in 1995 in the Alexandria township of Johannesburg, 
Malawian, Zimbabwean and Mozambican migrants were systematically targeted by groups of 
South Africans, beaten, and then dragged to a police station in hopes of their deportation. The 
impetus behind this attack was to “‘clean’ the township of foreigners” (Human Rights Watch 
1998, section I). 
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In other attacks, South Africans assume migrants are exacerbating various economic 
problems in South Africa, including the high unemployment rate. It would not be unusual for 
citizens to act on such assumptions when they are reinforced by xenophobic speeches made by 
government officials. HRW notes specific cases where nationals who assumed that migrants are 
the source of South African economic troubles targeted and attacked migrants. For instance, in 
Johannesburg in 1997, South African traders systematically attacked foreign traders and pillaged 
their businesses for two days straight. South African groups which participated in the attacks 
even issued flyers describing their cause. One flyer stated: “We want to clean the foreigners from 
our pavement." A similar attack happened a few days later in another part of Johannesburg 
(Human Rights Watch 1998, section VI). Though these attacks against foreigners who owned 
businesses occurred in 1997, similar attacks continue to occur.  The attack on Somali traders in 
the Cape Town township, Masiphumelele, in late 2006 mirrors the earlier attacks in 
Johannesburg.xvii 
HRW states that, when such abuses occurred, the police did little to protect the migrants. 
HRW claims that South Africans’ negative attitude toward migrants enables the police, 
government, and army to ignore their obligations to protect refugees and asylum seekers and 
further allows officials, themselves, to abuse migrants (Human Rights Watch 1998, section VI). 
Although the empirical section of the paper coded the right to personal physical integrity as 
“none,” descriptions of attacks on refugees by the public and police that are condoned in a 
discriminatory environment demonstrate that there are indeed instances of a “low” realization of 
the right to personal physical integrity, often instigated by or enabled through a negative cultural 
attitude toward refugees. 
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A more recent report was issued by HRW that similarly describes instances of 
xenophobia and abuse of refugee rights, showing that the lot of refugees and asylum seekers 
living in South Africa has not improved greatly since 1998. “Living on the Margins: Inadequate 
Protection for Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Johannesburg” (2005) details a number of 
human rights that refugees and asylum seekers are unable to access in South Africa. Included in 
this report is a lengthy discussion of the low realization of the right to protection from unlawful 
detention as well as physical assaults on refugees made by the police. While this report is useful 
to consider on its own, it is also useful to compare it with HRW’s 1998 report to see what has not 
changed for refugees living in South Africa. The national public opinion polls conducted by 
SAMP which I discuss later in this section suggest that the lives of refugees currently living in 
South Africa may even be worse than they were in 1998, due to an increase in negative cultural 
attitudes toward foreigners. 
The report discusses multiple instances where asylum seekers and refugees, though they 
possessed legal documents, were made to pay the police in order to avoid arrest and detention. 
HRW also asserts that when refugees do not immediately give into the demands of the police, 
but rather stress their rights under international and domestic refugee laws, they are more likely 
to be physically assaulted and possibly arrested. One refugee told HRW interviewers of an 
instance where he greeted two police officers one evening when leaving his apartment, and the 
police officers demanded to see his refugee papers. The refugee describes his assault and 
subsequent arrest: 
 He searched me and squeezed my genitals. I asked him if this was the procedure 
of the police. I produced my permit. He took it and kept it. When we were in the 
foyer of the building, I told the police officer that I knew my rights. They said to 
me that I thought I knew too much; this is South Africa. The police ordered a 
civilian…to take me out to the police car. I protested. The police officer slapped 
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me on my face. The other hit me under my eye with his head. The one police 
officer held me on one side and dragged me to the police car…”  
 
He then tells HRW representatives that, once inside the police van, the officers demanded that he 
pay a fine in order to be released. After his release, the police officers charged the refugee on 
three counts: “assaulting a police officer, resisting arrest, and obstructing the police officer in the 
execution of their duties” (Human Rights Watch 2005, 37-38). This is just one case described in 
this report in which the South African police physically assaulted a refugee.  Although the 
empirical section of this paper coded the realization of the right to personal physical integrity as 
“none,” HRW’s reports of this right being abused by South African officials suggests that the 
ability of refugees in South Africa to realize their right to physical integrity is significantly 
limited. 
The HRW report also suggest that refugees are frequently detained and threatened with 
repatriation, indicating the possibility of a low realization of the right to protection from 
unlawful detention. One problem that HRW points to is the failure by government officials to 
understand documentation or immigration laws. Often, this happens because the police (rather 
than immigration officers) arrest suspected illegal migrants. An officer can only legally detail a 
suspected illegal migrant for 48 hours. After this, the detainee is required to prove that he is 
legally in the country. Despite possession of a valid status document, however, an officer may 
not recognize the document or claim it is fraudulent, in which case the detainee is illegally 
deported, despite possession of legal documentation. South African immigration law also makes 
it illegal to detain or deport undocumented migrants who are currently seeking asylum status, but 
often officers will detain and deport undocumented migrants because they do not currently have 
any documentation (Human Rights Watch 2005, 41). HRW’s report thus points to a tendency for 
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migrants to be unlawfully deported, indicating that this right may have a low realization, despite 
its coding as “none” in the empirical portion of this paper. 
The reports published by Human Rights Watch and Refugees International represent an 
international NGO perspective on the situation of refugees and asylum seekers living in South 
Africa. I now turn to reports issued by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) in order 
to show how the domestic NGO perspective mirrors that of the international NGO. SAMP 
researchers Jonathan Crush and Wade Pendleton claim that South Africa experiences high levels 
of xenophobia in their report, “Regionalizing Xenophobia: Citizen Attitudes to Immigration and 
Refugee Policy in Southern Africa” (2004). Their assessment of South Africans’ attitudes toward 
refuges as negative mirrors my own; although I coded the independent variable as “none” in the 
empirical section of this paper, the second most frequently coded category was “negative” (47% 
versus 43%). 
In “Regionalizing Xenophobia,” Crush and Pendleton analyze the National Immigration 
Policy Surveys conducted by SAMP.  According to their 1998 and 1999 surveys, 63.7% of all 
South African respondents wanted to “strictly limit the numbers of foreigners who enter [South 
Africa].”  Other surveys asked respondents about their attitudes toward granting foreigners 
specific rights. While these surveys cannot inherently claim that refugees have a low or high 
realization of those rights discussed in the survey, it is useful to look at the rights South Africans 
think refugees and asylum seekers should be entitled to enjoy. Citizens of southern Africa 
(including South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, and Zimbabwe) were all 
surveyed about their attitudes toward granting foreigners (including temporary workers/visitors, 
refugees, and illegal immigrants) certain rights, such as the right to criticize the government, the 
right to vote, the right to legal protection, the right to police protection, and the right to access to 
 51 
acess social services. Unfortunately for this study, the results of this SAMP survey were not 
desegregated by country. However, Crush and Pendleton write that South Africans, of all the 
southern African countries surveyed, were the least willing to grant rights to foreigners. Overall, 
7.5% of southern African citizens thought that refugees should be granted the right to criticize 
the government, 2.5% agreed to granting refugees the right to vote, 42% thought refugees should 
be granted legal protection, 51.1% agreed that refugees should have the right to police 
protection, and 55.2% believed that refugees should be able to access social services. For all of 
these rights, the number of respondents who believed that refugees should be afforded certain 
rights bordered just above 50% or far below (Crush 2004, 41-42). While no definite conclusions 
can be drawn about how South Africans, specifically, feel about granting these rights to refugees, 
it should still be noted that if the southern African community did not overwhelmingly support 
granting refugees rights (rights they actually are granted under South African domestic and 
international law), and South Africans respondents were the least willing to grant foreigners 
rights, then these rights for refugees in South Africa are even more challenged by the general 
public.  Given these findings, it is plausible that South Africans may hold  negative attitudes 
toward refugees.  
Crush and Pendleton also discuss NIPS surveys that refer to the independent variable, the 
orientation of South African attitudes toward foreigners. One such survey asked respondents to 
associate foreigners with a “stereotyping activity,” such as taking jobs from locals, committing 
crimes, or creating jobs.  Respondents were asked to rate the percentage of foreigners who 
commit a certain activity on a scale from 0 to 10 (0 being “none of them do it” and 10 being “all 
of them do it”). When respondents were asked to associate foreigners with negative activities 
(including taking jobs from locals, commiting crimes in the host country, sending earnings out of 
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the host country, using the host country’s welfare services, and bringing diseases into the host 
country), the mean score was higher (i.e., more respondents thought that all foreigners should be 
associated with the negative activity). Mean scores ranged from 6.9-7.4.  When asked to 
associate foreigners with positive activities (including creating jobs and bringing skills into the 
host country), the mean was much lower (i.e., from 3.0-3.8) (Crush 2004, 23-24). 
In “The Dark Side of Democracy: Migration, Xenophobia and Human Rights in South 
Africa,” another SAMP report, Crush discusses six national public opinion surveys conducted in 
1998 and 1999.  Three of these surveys are pertinent to my study. One finding Crush discusses is 
that, despite a growing history of democracy and respect for human rights, South Africa has 
become increasingly xenophobic since the fall of the Apartheid government. In 1995, 49% of 
respondents in public opinion poll said that South Africa should “place strict limits on the 
numbers of foreigners who can come” into the country. This number grew to 53% of the South 
African population surveyed in 1999. Moreover, the second highest percent of respondents in 
1999 said that South Africa should “prohibit people coming [to South Africa] from other 
countries.” This number rose from 16% of those surveyed in 1995 (Crush 2004, 11).  Crush 
proposes that the growing xenophobia in South Africa may be linked to nation building. As he 
writes, “xenophobia is the underside of democratic nationalism” (Crush 2000, 118). These 
findings indicate that the orientation of South African attitudes toward refugees is becoming 
increasingly more negative. 
Other SAMP survey questions suggest that South Africans generally hold a negative 
attitude toward refugees based on the measures respondents were willing to take to keep 
foreigners out of the country and to monitor their presence once inside the country.  One quarter 
(i.e., 25%) of all respondents surveyed agreed that immigration and migration should be 
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completely banned in South Africa (Crush 2000, 109). In a 1998 SAMP survey, 66% of 
respondents said that they would support the government if it “[turned] on the electric fence that 
surrounds part of South Africa’s borders” in order to keep foreigners out. This electric fence was 
used by the Apartheid government to keep anti-government factions (such as the armed wing of 
the African National Congress) who were training in other countries from re-entering South 
Africa. In the SAMP survey, 72% of respondents said that they would support the government if 
it “[required] foreigners to carry identification with them at all times” (Crush 2000, 126). As 
Crush writes, this requirement harkens back to the Apartheid-issued pass laws, in which “black” 
South Africans were restricted in their freedom of movement and required to carry a passport in 
order to travel internally throughout South Africa. Although these two responses do not directly 
relate to the independent variable used for this study, the willingness of South African 
respondents to restrict rights and discriminate against foreigners in ways reminiscent of 
Apartheid policies suggest that South Africans hold negative attitudes toward refugees (Crush 
2000, 110).  
As Crush writes, these xenophobic and discriminatory attitudes also have “serious rights 
implications” for foreigners (Crush 2000, 110). Although none of the three SAMP surveys 
directly address either right used to operationalize my dependent variable, the responses to other 
questions suggest that the realization of the right to protection from unlawful detention and the 
right to personal physical integrity are threatened. For instance, 20% of those surveyed in 1999 
felt that all foreigners in South Africa, regardless of legal status, should be deported (Crush 2000, 
109).  Although this does not directly indicate that there is a low realization of the right to 
protection from unlawful detention, it does suggest that if refugees were being illegally detained 
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(and possibly deported), about one fifth of the South African population would not speak out 
against it. 
In terms of the realization of the right to personal physical integrity, the frequency of 
South Africans surveyed who said that refugees should “never” be granted the “right to police 
protection” indicates that it may be difficult for refugees in South Africa to realize a right to 
personal physical security when the host population believes the police should not protect them 
(when their physical security is attacked, for instance).  In a 1999 SAMP survey, 42.2% of 
respondents said that refugees should “never” be granted the right to police protection, and 
40.7% said that refugees should only be granted the right “sometimes.”  Only 16.7% said that 
refugees should “always” be granted this right. The numbers are even more startling in light of 
the fact that, under South African law, refugees should be granted these rights (Crush 2000, 128). 
In addition to the reports issued by both domestic and international NGOs, the South 
African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), a government entity, similarly suggests that the 
rights of refugees in South Africa are under threat and thus may be unrealized. In 1999, the 
SAHRC issued a report entitled “Report into the Arrest and Detention of Suspected 
Undocumented Migrants,” based on interviews with 149 detainees of the Lindela Repatriation 
Centre (a holding facility for migrants awaiting trial, repatriation, or deportation to a third 
country) and members of their families in 1997.  Overall, the SAHRC and contributing members 
to this report, which included representative of the Witwatersrand Law Clinic and Centre for 
Applied Legal Studies and Lawyers for Human Rights, found that the human rights of refugees 
who are apprehended, detained, and deported are abused – all in violation of their right to 
protection from unlawful detention.  
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To begin, the SAHRC pointed to the rise in xenophobic attacks against refugees and 
other migrants. This, it claimed, justified the reason for investigating the abuse of rights for 
detained refugees and other migrants. The SAHRC report begins by detailing a flurry of 
xenophobic attacks: 
 
First, on Thursday, 3 September 1998, three Senegalese nationals were murdered 
on a crowded Pretoria-Johannesburg train.  Investigations conducted by groups 
working with refugees and asylum-seekers have revealed that hate-motivated 
attacks such as these suggest that non-nationals may be more vulnerable to violent 
attacks than nationals.  For example, the Cape Town Refugee Forum has reported 
a sharp rise in anti-foreigner motivated homicides within the last year. And, 
during the course of investigations conducted by Lawyers for Human Rights into 
the 3 September 1998 incident, another Senegalese national died after allegedly 
slipping from a balcony window in the presence of several SAPS [South African 
Police Service] officers.  Members of the Senegalese community in Johannesburg 
have reported unusually high rates of deaths from ‘other than natural causes.’ 
Second, in October 1998, eighteen persons were killed in Botswana by 
suffocation in a truck in which they were being transported with a view towards 
illegal entrance into South Africa (Kollapen et al 1999, 9). 
 
These attacks, as well as the attention they gained from the SAHRC and domestic NGOs, seem 
to indicate that South Africans hold a negative attitude toward refugees. 
 The SAHRC investigation also found numerous cases where refugees or other migrants 
were unlawfully arrested and detained, sometimes leading to repatriation or deportation. This 
would result in a low realization of the right to protection from unlawful detention. For instance, 
the report claims that South African police often arrest refugees or demand to see their status 
papers without due cause to suspect them of being illegal. South Africa’s Aliens Control Act 96 
of 1991 (hereafter: Aliens Control Act), however, stipulates that officers must have a “reasonable 
suspicion” in order to question and arrest the migrant. While the SAHRC admits that part of the 
problem in adhering to the law comes from its unclear wording, the Commission also found that 
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South African immigration and police officers frequently “use random pedestrian spot checks or 
area sweeps to apprehend persons with a view towards removal from the country.” 
The SAHRC data shows that a majority of arrests (42.3%) were the result of a random 
sweep or spot-check, 14.1% of a house or village search, and 7.9% of a “language/appearance” 
check. In the later case, the detainee was only questioned because he “looked like a foreigner.” 
The SAHRC found that at least 10% of all detainees were questioned by the police based on their 
physical appearance.  This finding links xenophobic tendencies of South African officials with a 
low realization of refugee rights (mirroring the independent and dependent variables of my 
study). Overall, over 50% of all detainees were apprehended based on “random” search criteria, 
not “reasonable suspicion.” This violates South African law (Kollapen et al 1999, 20-22).  If any 
of these arrests lead to unlawful detention and put the asylum seeker at risk of repatriation or 
deportation, it can then be said that there is a low realization of the right to protection from 
unlawful detention, based on the SAHRC empirical evidence. 
 Other migrants were illegally detained and deported because South African officials 
destroyed the migrants’ legal documentation. This, in turn, leads to low realization of the right to 
protection from unlawful detention. As one detainee at Lindela told the SAHRC: “The police 
don’t care even if you have an ID with you, if they suspect you ... they just detain you” 
(Kollapen et al 1999, 25).  Although a majority of those arrested did not hold legal status in the 
country, a significant proportion (20.8%) claimed to have identification documents, which South 
African police or immigration officials did not ask to see before detaining the migrants. Some of 
these identification documents, however, were invalid (for instance, had an expired visa).  In all, 
slightly over 30% of all detainees had, or at least claimed to have, identification documents. The 
Aliens Control Act states that officers must allow migrants in question to show their documents 
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or obtain them if not on the person. Frequent detention of those who possess some sort of 
documentation indicates that this part of the law is not fully followed (Kollapen et al 1999, 24-
25).  
 Also troubling to SAHRC investigators was the “endemic” problem of corruption among 
police and immigration officers. The SAHRC found that it was common for the officers to take 
bribes from detainees before releasing them or allowing them to realize their legal rights. For 
instance, the SAHRC reported that many officers would require detainees to pay a bribe in order 
to go back home to retrieve their identification documents, although the Aliens Control Act 
guarantees the right to return to retrieve documents (Kollapen et al 1999, 30-31).  
 The SAHRC report also suggests that the right to personal physical integrity may also 
have a low realization during the arrest and detention process itself. The Commission’s 
investigation found that the police and Department of Home Affairs officials physically assaulted 
19.5% of all detainees to varying degrees, and another 8.7% claimed to have been threatened 
with physical assault during their arrest (Kollapen et al 1999, 34-35).  In addition, the 
Commission found that there was abuse by police following arrest, within the prison itself. 
Although a majority of migrant detainees (79.2%) claimed that they had not been assaulted, 
another 20.1% said that officers at Lindela had physically assaulted them or another refugee 
detainee. Interviews conducted by the SAHRC indicated that often the violence reported was not 
prompted by any act committed by the detainee, but was rather administered at random. One 
refugee detainee told the Commission of a time he was assaulted by the prison guards, saying: 
“The security hit me in the mouth (on 13-04-98). He hit me with his knob kerrie. The reason 
seems to be that he found me in the toilet and asked why am I in the toilet at that time.” Another 
refugee who was detained said: “Yesterday, one guy who[se] money was stolen tried to report 
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the matter to the guards but he was turned down and beaten until he was weak and could not 
walk....” (Kollapen et al 1999, 45-47). Although a majority of refugees detained at this facility 
were not assaulted, the fact that approximately one in every five refugees detained at one South 
African facility experienced violence or had seen a fellow detainee assaulted suggests that the 
realization of the right to personal physical integrity is threatened. 
Although the field notes, NGO reports, and SAHRC report findings were not meant to 
replace the empirical section of this paper, my aim was to counterbalance the somewhat 
inconclusive findings, and to demonstrate that the realization of refugee rights in South Africa is 
indeed under threat. Domestic and international government as well as NGO entities have all 
claimed that South African citizens are highly xenophobic, and thus exhibits a negative attitude 
toward refugees. Ways to counter hostility toward foreigners, namely, refugees, in South Africa 
are necessary to ensure that vulnerable populations are able to realize their legal rights. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
A. Theoretical Implications  
 
The question addressed in this paper – whether or not South Africans’ cultural attitudes 
toward refugees have an affect on the realization of refugee rights – is of theoretical significance 
for human rights and political science scholars.  It suggests that the ratification of international 
law and granting legal rights through domestic legislation are not sufficient to protect refugees.  
If domestic biases result in a refugee population experiencing fewer rights than those legally 
guaranteed, then domestic law and international treaties have a limited impact upon refugee 
rights protection; they are weakened by domestic public opinion. By demonstrating a fissure 
between de jure and de facto rights, scholars and human rights activists can justify promoting a 
 59 
“bottom up” approach to rights protection as well as a legal approach.  Ensuring that the public is 
in support of, or at least aware of, the legal protections offered vulnerable populations, such as 
refugees, may minimize the divide between de jure and de facto rights and better ensure that the 
rights of vulnerable peoples are realized.  In this way, international forces and domestic actors 
must enter into a “two-level game” with one another; when countries ratify international law, the 
government must ensure that it has the legal policies and programs at home necessary to inform 
and change the cultural attitudes of the domestic constituency so that they are in favor of the 
international law as well as the government. 
In South Africa, de jure rights for refugees are among the most expansive of any state, 
especially developing ones.  Research on the ground, however, tells a different story. Here, 
homelessness, hunger, unemployment, and xenophobic attacks toward refugees are the norm. 
The challenge for the state and international community is to develop means of closing the gap 
between what a state says it will provide migrants (de jure) and what rights refugees are able to 
realize (de facto).  
Although the empirical results of this paper did not suggest a strong link between cultural 
attitudes and the realization of refugee rights, the negative leaning of those interviews and 
articles not coded as “none” does suggest that South Africans may hold negative biases toward 
refugees. Moreover, the right to personal physical integrity and to protection from unlawful 
detention is at least challenged, as evidence by the HRW, RI, SAMP, and SAHRC report 
reviewed here.  Taking the quantitative data together with the qualitative evidence, the low 
realization of several refugee rights and the xenophobic attitude among many South Africans 
merit attention.  Theorists who stress that a country’s ratification of international law advances 
human rights must look more closely at cases like that of South Africa and its refugee population 
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before hailing the protective power of international law, alone.  A combined, two-level approach 
is necessary. 
 
B. Implications for New Policy Approaches  
 
 In order to rectify the gap between the manifold de jure rights seen in South Africa and 
the more limited de facto rights, I suggest that South Africa institute a two-fold rights awareness 
program. One segment of this campaign would be to inform South African’s of the rights of 
others through workshops. Some South African interviewees were critical of whether or not the 
human rights awareness campaigns, such as “Roll Back Xenophobia,” were working, insofar as 
citizens still maintained and openly expressed their hostile attitudes toward refugees.  For this 
reason, I suggest that the government (and the NGOs that may help run the awareness programs) 
change their tactics.  The first change I suggest is that the citizen-based awareness campaign 
should target South African government officials, immigration officers, the police, and other 
public service employees who commonly encounter migrants (i.e., those who work at public 
hospitals).  By focusing on educating public service workers, the trainings can be made 
mandatory and can be instituted on a regular basis (for instance, as required annual training, or 
training for all new employees). The second change I suggest is to make the training more 
tangible. That is, rather than informing employees that refugees have a right to access to social 
services, to instead show employees what a South African identity document looks like (in order 
to clarify the different between the rights associated with a red, South African identification card 
and the green one that non-nationals carry).  This way, the rights awareness programs can 
specifically target areas that could lead to discrimination, rather than trying to change the 
mindset of people.  
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The second part of this awareness program should focus on educating refugees of their 
own rights, including conducting programs or issuing pamphlets in some commonly used native 
languages. Provided with the knowledge of their guaranteed domestic and international rights as 
refugees and the ability to stand up for them, South African citizens may be less likely to get 
away with abusing the rights of refugees. 
 While the above program changes should specifically target the interactions between 
South African citizens and refugees, as the secondary source assessment showed, a large part of 
the time, it is government officials or the police who are abusing the rights of refugees. Aside 
from making rights awareness training mandatory, the South African government should also 
take a hard approach to tackling the issue of abuse by officials. This may include setting up an 
investigatory agency or commission to which refugees (or other non-citizens protected under 
South African law) may file complaints against authorities. As the system currently stands, 
refugees may only file complaints to the police, including complaints against the police, with 
little assurance that their case will be reviewed.  Having an independent entity to which to make 
complaints will not only increase refugees’ confidence that they are being protected under South 
African law, but may also decrease the likelihood that police or immigration officers will abuse 
refugees (either physically or through unlawful detention and deportation). A separate entity 
charged with investigated crimes against migrants may also decrease government corruption, as 
seen most vividly in the Department of Home Affairs. This investigatory complaints unit will act 
as a watchful eye over those government entities which have abused the rights of refugees in the 
past.
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Endnotes 
                                                 
i
 For more information on the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees or to see what states have ratified this 
convention, see the United Nations site, at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/o_c_ref.htm.  
ii
 The International Refugee Organization (IRO) was founded after WWII as a specialized United National agency in 
order to manage the post-war refugee crisis. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has 
since replaced the IRO. 
iii
 An important exception to this is the large body of studies published by the Institute for Democracy in South 
Africa’s (IDASA) South African Migration Project (SAMP). This large Southern African NGO has produced 
multiple research publications on migrant rights in Southern Africa, using tools such as public opinion surveys and 
semi-structured interviews, all which fall under the “cultural attitudes” approach. 
iv
 While Putnam’s “constituency” usually referred to Parliamentarians or other formal types of constituents, I apply 
the term here to the general population, focusing, in particular, on “cultural attitudes” toward refugees. 
v
 Kate Lefko-Everett, email correspondence, October 27, 2007, South African Migration Project. 
vi
 Vincent Williams, interview, June 26, 2007, Institute for Democracy in South Africa, Cape Town, South Africa. 
vii
 George Pambason, interview, June 12, 2007, Alliance for Refugees in South Africa, Cape Town, South Africa. 
viii
 University of Connecticut Institutional Review Board (IRB) Protocol Number: H07-054 
ix
 Lefko-Everett, October 27, 2007. 
x
 The surveying methodology for the SAMP polls is as follows: The survey samples sizes were 3,500 (1998 survey 
on attitudes toward migration); 3,200 (1998 survey on diversity attitudes toward migrants); and 1,600 (1999 survey 
on attitudes toward human right, migrants, and refugees). All sample pools for the surveys were “drawn from 
official census data and information from national organizations that attempt to maintain population statistics. From 
this information a clustered, random stratified, nationally representative sample was drawn. Specifically, the 
procedure involved randomly selecting a series of ‘primary sampling units’ (PSUs) from a larger list of suburbs and 
magisterial districts, the chance of selection being weighted proportionately by the population of the suburb or the 
district. Once a PSU had been established, maps were used to select, at random, a place to begin interviewing. 
Interviewers would then be required to walking a randomly determined direction and conduct an interview at every 
nth home, depending on how many interviews were required within that designated PSU.” Surveyors were also 
trained and “required to follow strict rules.” The surveys were also designed “so that respondents were required to 
answer questions in a standard format, but one that offered them a range of response alternatives…In the simplest 
case the answer categories might be a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ but in most cases respondents could express their attitude 
using a scale with a variety of subtle category differences.” This might include the use of scales or designations such 
as “strongly agree” or “strongly disagree. For more information on the methodology used by SAMP, consult Mattes, 
R. et al. (1999, 5-6). 
xi
 It is also appropriate to note, here, the overarching right to non-discrimination, established in multiple international 
laws, including: the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Article 3) (United Nations General 
Assembly 1951); the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Articles 2 and 28) (Organization of African 
Unity 1981); the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (Article 2) (United Nations 
General Assembly 1966), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 3) (United Nations 
General Assembly 1966).  South Africa has ratified all of these international laws, in addition to the two optional 
protocols of the ICCPR (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratifications 
of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, June 9, 2004, available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf). Moreover, these rights are further established through South African domestic 
law, in South Africa’s Bill of Rights in Chapter 2 of the Constitution (Republic of South African Constitution 1996). 
In addition, South Africa has made a legal commitment, domestically and internationally, to equally afford rights to 
asylum seekers and refugees regardless of their race, ethnicity, country of origin, religion, or other factors. That said, 
in order for South Africa to meet its commitment to non-discrimination, it must equally afford rights to asylum 
seekers, refugees, and citizens (i.e., citizens are no more entitled to personal integrity rights than refugees). This is 
important to keep in mind as realization of the two dependent variable rights are measured and assessed. 
xii
 For more detail on the methodology used in conducting these SAMP polls, please refer to footnote #3. 
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xiii
 The second coder’s results for interview coding agreed 100% of the time with my coding results. He re-coded 
10% of the transcribed interview responses (or 2 interviews total). The interviews chosen for re-coding were 
selected at random. All articles were printed and turned face down, and then 2 were randomly drawn from the pile 
for coding. 
xiv
 The second coder’s results for media coding agreed 98% of the time with my coding results. He re-coded 10% of 
the media articles (or 12 articles total) and agreed 100% with both my independent variable coding and my coding 
for the first part of the dependent variable. Our results were different for only one article when coding the second 
part of the dependent variable. The articles chosen for re-coding were selected at random. All articles were printed 
and turned face down, and then 12 were randomly drawn from the pile for coding. 
xv
 All field notes discussed in this section were taken from May to July 2007. No names are given for the individuals  
whose accounts are mentioned. 
xvi
 William Kerfoot, interview, May 17, 2007, Legal Resources Centre, Cape Town, South Africa. 
xvii
 For more information on these attacks, see Deji Olukotun, 2007, “Refugees and Conflict Resolution in the 
Western Cape of South Africa: Field Report,” The Journal of Global Majority 1 (1): 1-8, 
<http://dialogue.globalmajority.com/index.php?option=com_content&task =blogcategory&id=23&Itemid=78> 
December 4, 2007. 
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Appendix A 
Interview Questions for NGO and Government Employees 
 
Note: Only responses to boldface questions were coded. All questions were asked. 
 
1. What kinds of services are refugees in South Africa accessing? 
 
2. Who is providing these services? 
 
3. How are refugees from different African states or regions perceived by the South 
African public? 
 
4. What is the capacity of the South Africa state to meet the needs of its refugee population? 
 
5. What support is the South African government receiving from the UN, the EU, the U.S., the 
African Union, and other international donor communities to address the refugees’ needs? 
 
6. Where are the areas of greatest need?  
 
7. What barriers exist to the provision of adequate services? 
 
8. Are refugees isolated or integrated into South African society? Can you rate their 
integration in different areas of South Africa or the Western Cape region? 
 
9. Who is doing most relief work?  Islamic charities (in particular for Somali refugees)?  UN?  
NGOs? African Union? The South African government? 
 
10. What changes would you like to see made to South Africa’s refugee resettlement policies? 
Do you think a different strategy would work more effectively? 
o How do you feel about refugee camps? 
 
11. Do you think South Africa is doing a good job compared to other refugee receiving states 
(both in and outside the African continent)? 
 
12. What qualities have characterized the relationship between NGOs and the government so far? 
 
13. What, if anything, would you like to see change in the partnership between the government 
and NGOs, or between different NGOs, themselves? Are there any changes you can propose? 
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14. What qualities of the government and NGOs have facilitated partnership? 
 
15. What qualities of the government and NGOs have hindered partnership? 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B 
Media Coding Rules for the Independent Variable 
 
“The orientation (positive/negative) of South African cultural attitudes toward refugees and 
asylum seekers” 
 
Note: For media articles, the entire article will serve as the unit of analysis and will be assigned a 
single score. 
 
An article will be coded POSITIVE (i.e.: expressing a positive attitude) if it: 
 
1. uses key words such as “positive,” “good,” or “beneficial,” or “suffering” to describe 
refugees/asylum seekers in South Africa 
2. says that refugees are “equal” to South Africans or share “equal/the same rights” as South 
Africans 
3. acknowledges a positive contribution refugees/asylum seekers have made to South Africa 
4. talks about the plight of refugees or one particular refugee 
5. talks about ways South Africans can help refugees/asylum seekers 
 
An article will be coded NEGATIVE (i.e.: expressing a negative attitude) if it: 
 
1. describes refugee populations as “overwhelming” or “flooding” South Africa, or “too large” 
2. uses words such as “illegal” or “undocumented” to describe refugees/asylum seekers 
3. ascribes characteristics such as “aggressive,” “dangerous,” “violent,” “criminal,” “thieves,” 
“drug smugglers” or “rapist” to refugees or asylum seekers 
4. uses words such as “negative,” “hostile,” “bad,” “poor,” and similar synonyms to describe the 
attitude or treatment of South Africans toward refugees/asylum seekers 
5. uses the word “xenophobic/xenophobia” to describe how refugees are treated 
6. describes attacks or violations of rights as “not too severe” 
7. discusses refugees as “less entitled” to rights than South Africans 
8. uses the case of one negative refugee/asylum seeker to generalize characteristics of all 
refugees/asylum seekers 
9. describes the need for South Africa to take measures to allow fewer refugees into the country, 
such as tighter border security or increased arrests  
10. discredits NGO reports regarding attacks on refugees 
11. blames refugees for high crime rates or associates them with criminal statistics by closely 
associating the words “refugee” and “high crime” or “ criminal activity” in the article 
 
An article will be coded NEUTRAL (i.e.: expressing neither a positive or negative attitude) if it: 
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1. does not meet the criteria of “Positive” or “Negative” as stated above, but does address a 
question or state an opinion regarding cultural attitudes of refugees in South Africa 
 
An article will be coded NONE if it: 
1. is a descriptive or factual statement unrelated to attitudes 
2. is not germane to project 
 
Appendix C 
Interview Coding Rules for the Independent Variable 
 
“The orientation (positive/negative) of South African cultural attitudes toward refugees and 
asylum seekers” 
 
Note: For interviews, responses to a subset of questions will be coded and an overall score assigned per interview 
based on combined question scores. This score reflects how “negative” or “positive” the interview viewed the 
situation of the refugees to be. 
 
Interviewee assessment of the refugee situation will be coded POSITIVE (i.e.: expressing a 
positive attitude) if it: 
 
1. uses words such as “positive,” “good,” or “beneficial” to describe refugees/asylum seekers in 
South Africa 
2. uses words such as “welcome” and “positive” are used to describe the reception refugees 
receive in South Africa 
3. describes refugees/asylum seekers as “integrated” 
4. includes phrases such as: “South Africans are aware of (or respect) refugee rights” 
 
Interviewee assessment of the refugee situation will be coded NEGATIVE (i.e.: expressing a 
negative attitude) if it: 
 
1. uses words such as “illegal” or “undocumented” to describe refugees/asylum seekers 
2. ascribes characteristics such as “dangerous,” “violent,” “criminal,” “thieves,” “drug 
smugglers” or “rapist” to refugees or asylum seekers 
3. uses the words such as “burden,” “strain,” “problem,” “targets/targeting,” or “liability” to 
describe refugees 
4. discusses arrests of refugee/asylum seekers or frequent talk of criminal statistics in relation to 
“ refugee-prompted violence or crime” 
5. uses words such as “negative,” “hostile,” “bad,” “poor,” and similar synonyms to describe the 
attitude or treatment of South Africans toward refugees/asylum seekers 
6. uses racially derogatory terms to describe refugees/asylum seekers, such a “nigger” or 
“kwerekwere” 
7. uses the word “xenophobic/xenophobia” to describe how refugees are treated 
8. discusses South Africans as “fearful of,” “hostile toward,” “resentful of,” or “in conflict with” 
refugees/asylum seekers 
9. describes refugees/asylum seekers as “isolated” 
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Interviewee assessment of the refugee situation will be coded NEUTRAL (i.e.: expressing 
neither  a positive or negative attitude) if it: 
1. does not meet the criteria of “Positive” or “Negative” as stated above, but does address a 
question or state an opinion regarding cultural attitudes of refugees in South Africa 
 
Interviewee assessment of the refugee situation will be coded NONE if it: 
1. is a descriptive or factual statement unrelated to attitudes 
2. is not germane to project 
Appendix D 
 Media Coding Rules for Dependent Variable (1) 
 
“The realization of refugee rights: the right to personal physical integrity” 
 
Note: For media articles, the entire article will serve as the unit of analysis and will be assigned a 
single score. 
 
An article will be coded HIGH (i.e.: a high realization of the right) if it: 
 
1. describes the situation in which refugees are living as “secure” or “safe” 
2. describes treatment of refugees as “humane”  
3. describes a third party, such as an NGO, defending the treatment of refugees or claiming that 
refugees are treated in accordance with South African and international law 
4. describes acts where South Africans protect refugees  
 
An article will be coded LOW (i.e.: a low realization of the right) if it: 
 
1. describes refugees as being treated like “animals” 
2. describes treatment of refugees as “cruel” or “inhuman” 
3. describes the situation in which refugees are living as “insecure” or “unsafe”  
4. describes acts of violence focused on refugee communities, such as “looting” refugee-owned 
shops, “stabbing” or “shooting” refugees, or rounding-up refugees to “beat” 
5. describes public officials causing physical harm or injury to refugees 
6. describes acts done by South African citizens that cause physical harm or injury to refugees 
8. states the number of refugees killed by South Africans within a given time period  
9. describes another party, such as an NGO, intervening because of suspected or proven abuse of 
refugees 
 
An article will be marked NEUTRAL if it: 
 
1. does not meet the criteria of “high” or “low,” as stated above, but does address a matter 
concerning safety and security of refugees  
 
An article will be marked NONE if it: 
 
1. offers a descriptive or factual statement unrelated to safety or security of the person 
2. is not germane to the project 
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Appendix E 
Interview Coding Rules for Dependent Variable (1) 
 
“The realization of refugee rights: the right to personal physical integrity” 
 
Note: For interviews, responses to a subset of questions will be coded and an overall score assigned per interview based on 
combined question scores. This score reflects how “high” or “low” the interviewee viewed the realization of the refugees right to 
be. 
 
Interviewee assessment of the realization of the refugee right will be coded HIGH (i.e.: a high 
realization of the right) if it: 
 
1. describes the situation in which refugees are living as “secure” or “safe” 
2. describes treatment of refugees as “humane”  
3. claims that refugees are “protected under South African or international law” 
4. describes acts by which South Africans “protect” refugees  
5. claims that the police or security guards protect refugees “equally as well as” South Africans 
6. claims that South African police or security guards will arrest a South African citizens for 
endangering or causing harm to a refugee 
 
Interviewee assessment of the realization of the refugee right will be coded LOW (i.e.: a low 
realization of the right) if it: 
 
1. describes refugees as being treated like “animals” 
2. describes treatment of refugees as “cruel,” “inhuman,” or “harmful” 
3. describes acts of violence focused on refugee communities, such as “looting” refugee-owned 
shops, “stabbing” or “shooting” refugees, or rounding-up refugees to “beat” or “targeted” for 
violent attacks 
4. describes the situation in which refugees are living as “insecure,” “unsafe,” or “dangerous” 
5. states the number of refugees “killed” by South Africans within a given time period  
6. claims that the police, security guards, or government “do not protect” refugees 
7. claims that refugees are “fearful” for their safety or well-being in South Africa 
8. describes a time where an NGO had to intervene on behalf of a refugee/refugee group in order 
to protect them or offer them security when community members or the government were not 
9. describes public officials causing physical harm or injury to refugees 
10. describes acts done by South African citizens that cause physical harm or injury to refugees 
11. claims that the police or security guards will not respond to a refugee’s claim or call for help 
12. claims that police will not arrest a South African for endangering or harming a refugee 
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Interviewee assessment of the realization of the refugee right will be coded NEUTRAL if it: 
 
1. does not meet the criteria of “high” or “low,” as stated above, but does address a matter 
concerning safety and security of refugees  
 
Interviewee assessment of the realization of the right will be marked NONE if it: 
1. offers a descriptive or factual statement unrelated to safety or security of the person 
2. is not germane to the project 
Appendix F 
Media Coding Rules for Dependent Variable (2) 
 
“The realization of refugee rights: the right to protection from unlawful detention” 
 
Note: For media articles, the entire article will serve as the unit of analysis and will be assigned a 
single score. 
 
An article will be coded HIGH (for a high realization of the right) if it: 
 
1. uses the phrase “legal (or “lawful”) deportation” 
2. states that all refugees deported were not documented 
3. states that all refugees deported were given time to apply for legal refugee status 
4. claims that South African public officials abide by the law when deporting refugees 
5. claims that all reported unlawful deportations of refugees are not true or the result of faulty 
reporting 
 
An article will be coded LOW (for a low realization of the right) if it: 
 
1. uses the phrase “illegal deportation” 
2. uses the phrase “arbitrary arrests” 
3. mentions NGOs or other groups that have called for South Africa to “stop (or “cease”) 
illegally deporting refugees” 
4. claims that refugees awaiting status determination at the Department of Home Affairs are 
fearful of deportation before their status has been granted 
5. mentions cases where South African officials are suspected to have deported refugees without 
undergoing proper legal proceedings, such as ensuring that they are legally documented or have 
legal entry into another country 
6. claims that South African public officials do not abide by the law when deporting refugees 
7. mentions raids on refugee enclaves that resulted in mass deportation 
8. claims that deported refugees were not able to apply for status documentation before being 
deported 
9. claims that refugees were waiting for status determination at the Department of Home Affairs 
but were deported 
 
An article will be coded NEUTRAL if it: 
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1. does not meet the criteria of “high” or “low,” as stated above, but does address a matter 
concerning deportation of refugees  
 
An article will be coded NONE if it: 
 
1. offers a descriptive or factual statement unrelated to deportation  
2. is not germane to the project 
 
 
Appendix G 
Interview Coding Rules for Dependent Variable (2) 
 
“The realization of refugee rights: the right to protection from unlawful detention” 
 
Note: For interviews, responses to a subset of questions will be coded and an overall score 
assigned per interview based on combined question scores. This score reflects how “high” or 
“low” the interviewee viewed the realization of the refugees right to be. 
 
Interviewee assessment of the realization of the refugee right will be coded HIGH (i.e.: a high 
realization of the right) if it: 
 
1. claims that South African public officials “abide by the law,” “act legally” or “act justifiably” 
when deporting refugees 
2. claims that all reported unlawful deportations of refugees are not true or the result of faulty 
reporting 
 
Interviewee assessment of the realization of the refugee right will be coded LOW (i.e.: a low 
realization of the right) if it: 
 
1. claims that South African public officials “do not abide by the law,” “act illegally,” or “act 
unjustifiably” when deporting refugees 
2. mentions cases where South African officials are suspected to have deported refugees without 
undergoing proper legal proceedings, such as ensuring that they are legally documented or have 
legal entry into another country 
3. mentions obstacles to timely status documentation (within the legally defined period) and the 
effect this has on deportation rates 
 
Interviewee assessment of the realization of the refugee right will be coded NEUTRAL if it: 
 
1. does not meet the criteria of “high” or “low,” as stated above, but does address a matter 
concerning deportation of refugees  
 
Interviewee assessment of the realization of the right will be marked NONE if it: 
 
1. offers a descriptive or factual statement unrelated to deportation  
2. is not germane to the project 
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